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**SHADOW WARS:
AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE**

by

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December 2005

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**SHADOW WARS:
AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare through a thorough analysis of the nature and strategies of insurgency, and a comparative examination of the current strategic approaches to counterinsurgency warfare. Toward this end, a systems model approach, which views insurgent organizations as open systems, is adapted to the insurgent environment. Popular support, external support, and insurgent organization are determined as the major variables of the insurgency system.

The evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and its implementation in the Algerian rebellion is examined under the light of the major variables of the system and strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. After an analysis of the F.L.N. tactics and French countermeasures during the Algerian rebellion between 1954 and 1962, three important propositions are offered: First, popular support is the primary condition for the success of the insurgent organization; second, political, social, economic, and administrative factors have primacy over military factors; and, third, domestic factors have primacy over external factors in the outcome of a rebellion.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so horrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it.

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first – as at Fontenoy, – preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. (Jomini, 1838/1932, pp. 29-35)

These are the words that the great general of the Napoleonic Wars and the strategist of war, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, used when he was writing about his experiences in Spain as a commander of one of the French armies. One can see nothing but contempt and hatred in his words for insurgency warfare. Certainly, Jomini is not alone in his feelings about that kind of war. Professional soldiers, by training and moral code of the professional military class, tend to see and fight wars as a duel in which each side can see his enemy and face death in a chivalrous fashion. Hit-and-run tactics and evasion of open confrontation are not seen as soldierly behavior.

Alas, whether we like it or not, these are the types of wars that modern world armies increasingly have to face. The “weak,” unable to confront the “strong” in a conventional war, have used and will continue to use the weapons of the weak that can change their weaknesses into strength. In fact, in the last sixty years, the number of insurgency wars significantly exceeds the number of conventional wars. The British in Malaya, Cyprus, Palestine, and Kenya; French in Indochina and in Algeria; Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya; and the U.S. in Greece, the Philippines, and in Vietnam all fought against insurgent groups or organizations. Unlike conventional wars, these wars tend to be protracted in nature; the Algerian War lasted eight years, and the struggle in Indochina continued for almost three decades. Yet, the bulk of the military budgets of world armies go to conventional armament, training, and nuclear weapons. The terms “small wars,” “low-intensity conflict,” or “little war” have confused many political and

military leaders about the scale and importance of these conflicts. The wars against insurgent movements have not received the importance they deserve.

A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The primary purpose of this study is to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare and, thus, uncover the fog of myth that surrounds the terms insurgency, counterinsurgency, rebellion, and popular support. To that end, the nature of insurgency, strategies of insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategies will be analyzed. By analyzing the factors or major variables that comprise the insurgent environment, we hope that the same factors that help an insurgent organization succeed or fail can also be used to defeat insurgents by governments. Once the nature of insurgency is revealed and the major variables are defined, a government can manipulate, to some extent, the evolution of an insurgent movement.

A second objective of the study is to evaluate and test the basic tenets of counterinsurgency strategies – such as the role of popular support, types and sources of external support, and the relative importance of military, social, political, and economical factors in the genesis of a rebellion. After a theoretical discussion in the first three chapters, these basic tenets are tested in the French counterinsurgency struggle against Algerian nationalists between 1954 and 1962.

A third objective of the study is to provide policy makers and military leaders with a textbook that reviews and summarizes the available literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare.

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

For those strategists and analysts who depicted decolonization and national liberation wars as part of a worldwide communist conspiracy, the end of the Cold War should also have meant an end to insurgency warfare. History has proved that they are wrong. Regardless of its political, ideological, or religious motivations, as long as one side is weak side and the other strong – e.g. an occupier and occupied country – there will always be some form of insurgency. As modern armies develop new weapons systems and increase their organizational quality, insurgent organizations transform themselves and adapt to the new threat environment. Insurgencies in the 1960s were far different from Spanish Peninsular War against the French or the Russian Partisan War against the

Grand Army of Napoleon; today's insurgencies are and will be different from the insurgencies of the past. Although we do believe that every insurgency is unique and must be examined and understood in its contextual environment, we also believe that there are some common principles that can guide our efforts throughout the struggle.

Toward this end, we believe that the only source that can provide us with guiding principles is "history." Proceeding from the fact (or belief) that "History is nothing but a repeating cycle," we believe that "things of the past" should not be treated as junk material, but as a rich source that can reveal the mistakes of the defeated as well as the secrets of the victors. A careful, thorough analysis of past insurgencies can provide us with the guiding principles that can help us to defeat future insurgencies.

The ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal, Chechnya, and Palestine demonstrate that state-of-the-art weapons systems, high-surveillance aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and other hi-tech systems that claim to digitalize the battlefield and transform war into a virtual war-game are insufficient to defeat insurgent organizations. Insurgency is a war of police and small-unit military forces. The technological advantage of modern armies, which achieved so much in conventional wars, achieves little against insurgencies.

C. ORGANIZATION

The study will start with a definition of insurgency. Because of abundant use of unclear, vague, and loose terms to define insurgency situations, a new definition that will clarify the term "insurgency" throughout the study is presented. Here, insurgency is defined as "a protracted politico-military struggle to overthrow an existing authority by an organized and indigenous movement."

Chapter II develops a systems approach to insurgency that allows us to analyze insurgency in a methodical way. Although the systems approach we will take is almost identical to the system approach that Leites and Wolf (1970) offered, the systems approach we present is different due in two regards. First, although Leites and Wolf utilized the input-output model that they derived from economics, they took a narrow approach and analyzed environmental factors only in relation to an insurgent organization. Secondly, we want to distinguish the systems model from the cost-benefit

calculations that comprise the essence of Leites and Wolf's model. After constructing the model, we will further examine three major variables: insurgent organization, popular support, and external support. The use of coercion and economic development programs are examined as media of social control.

Chapter III explores rural communist insurgency strategies of insurgency. Mao's protracted war strategy and Che Guevara's foco theory are thoroughly examined. "Terror" is analyzed in the context of an insurgency environment as a supplementary strategy to the overall strategy of insurgent organizations.

Chapter IV reviews current counterinsurgency strategies: the hearts-and-minds model and the cost-benefit model. It inspects the common points and differences between the two models.

Chapter V analyzes the origins and evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and the war in Algeria. The F.L.N.'s organizational and operational tactics are examined along with the French countermeasures.

Finally, Chapter VI summarizes over findings and assessments in the study and principal conclusions that are derived from the Algerian Liberation War against France. As a result, it is concluded that, in an insurgency environment, popular support is the main condition for the success or defeat of an insurgent movement. Even if an Authority manages to defeat the military component of an insurgent organization – as the French did – that may not be sufficient to win the war. A counterinsurgency campaign must be waged in all fronts; political, social, and economic efforts must effectively be combined with the military measures.

II. THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Definition of Insurgency

Before examining the nature of insurgency, the term ‘insurgency’ needs to be defined. As with most of the terms used in the political science literature, a cloud of ambiguity surrounds the term “insurgency,” and there is not a universally accepted definition. The abundance of new terms – whether to serve political purposes (to influence world or domestic public opinion) or to differentiate one particular case from another – has only caused more confusion. The terms “guerrilla warfare,” “irregular warfare,” “partisan warfare,” “internal warfare,” “insurgent warfare,” “low-intensity conflict,” “small wars,” “unconventional warfare,” “revolutionary warfare,” and “national liberation wars” are used interchangeably by both experts in the field and politicians. Some consciously use them interchangeably, but many do so without understanding the basic differences among the terms.

David Galula (1964), a noted expert on counterinsurgency warfare, defines insurgency as “a protracted struggle concluded methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order” (p. 4). However, this definition excludes the unconventional character of insurgency, and includes all kinds of protracted civil wars. Both American and Spanish Civil Wars are protracted struggles aimed at the overthrow of the existing authority. But neither the Confederates nor Franco’s troops deserve to be named as insurgents.

Sam Sarkesian (1975) uses “revolutionary guerrilla warfare” and “insurgency” synonymously and defines them as “the forcible attempt by a politically organized group to gain control or change the structure and/or policies of the government, using unconventional warfare integrated with political and social mobilization, resting on the premise that the people are both the targets and the actors” (p. 7). Another definition by Andrew Scott (1970) refers to the indigenous character of the insurgency and defines insurgency as “the efforts to obtain political goals by an organized and primarily indigenous group (or groups) using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political

techniques. This definition excludes sudden coups, short-lived outbreaks of violence, or invasions by non-indigenous guerrilla forces” (p. 5).

Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein (1990) offer a more analytical definition of insurgency. Although the definition excludes the “goals” of the insurgent organization, their approach to insurgency makes it easy to understand insurgency and helps us to analyze the sub-components of the insurgent struggle:

Insurgency is a syncretic phenomenon – one that joins diverse elements in an explosive mix. It combines three elements: first, the “spirit” of traditional peasant “rebellion;” second, the ideology and organization of modern “revolution;” and third, the operational doctrines of guerrilla warfare. (p. 442)

Eckstein and Desai’s definition present us with three important results: first, the rural areas (with their mountains, jungles, lack of roads, and poor communications) provide significant advantages to an insurgent movement; second, today’s insurgencies gained their “modern” character by borrowing the ideological and organizational framework of the revolutionary organizations in the French and Russian Revolutions; and third, the operational doctrine of guerrilla warfare enable a militarily weak side to confront a stronger side by evading open confrontation and hit-and-run tactics.

Despite the apparent differences in all of these definitions, three points are common to insurgencies: the struggle is protracted in nature, the objective is political and aimed at the overthrow of existing authority, and insurgents use unconventional tactics – guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage – as well as conventional tactics. Thus, in this work, the term “insurgency” will refer to “a protracted politico-military struggle to overthrow an existing authority by an organized and indigenous movement through the use of unconventional and conventional tactics.” The terms “insurgency,” “revolutionary war,” and “rebellion” will be used synonymously and interchangeably in this study.

B. INSURGENCY AS A SYSTEM

In his article, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” T. E. Lawrence (1920) claimed that he “would prove irregular war or rebellion to be an exact science, and an inevitable success, granted certain factors and if pursued along certain lines” (p. 21). He “did not prove it,” claimed Lawrence, “because the war stopped” (p. 22). However, even if he could have

verified his theory of rebellion before the end of World War I, he would certainly be far from having developed an “exact science.” The tendency to simplify and generalize complex situations has encouraged many students of insurgency to search for a universal theory that can define the problem and offer a coherent, workable strategy. The appeal of a holistic, universal theory that can provide a cure for any kind of insurgency introduces some traps and hazards to the researcher. J. Shy and T. Collier (Paret 1986, chap. 27) noted:

There is a danger, especially in dealing with the contemporary importance of revolutionary wars, of giving undue emphasis to theory at the expense of actual experience. Theory permits a degree of simplification that is attractive when confronted with the frequency, complexity, and variety of armed struggles that are in some sense “revolutionary” or “counterrevolutionary.” But the formalistic reduction of revolution to “stages,” for example, or of counterrevolution to isolating rebels from the “people” by winning their “hearts and minds” distorts the real world of modern experience. (p. 819)

Nevertheless, Shy and Collier (Paret 1986, chap. 27) admit the importance of “theory” in shaping real world experience, and warn that “While being careful not to succumb to the seduction of theoretical simplism, we should accept the power and appeal of theory as a major facet of the phenomenon of revolutionary/counterrevolutionary war” (pp. 819-820). There are various theories and strategies to explain both the evolution of insurgency and how to counter it. Some of those theories view insurgency as a completely military problem, in which insurgents are defined as a couple of bandits in the mountains or jungles, while others view insurgency as an exclusively political problem and ignore the vital role of insurgent organization. A systems approach to the insurgency problem should provide us a sufficiently broad perspective to cover both the military and the political aspects of the problem.

1. Organization as an Open System

Daft (2003) defines “system” as a “set of interacting elements that acquires inputs from the environment, transforms them, and discharges outputs to the external environment” (p. 6). To be effective, the parts of the system must interact and work together. The organizational system, as an interacting group of individuals working together to achieve a common goal, acquires inputs and exports outputs to the external

environment. The dependency on the external environment reflects how important the environmental factors are to the life cycle of the organizational system.

Although, an insurgent organization is clandestine by nature, it is not a closed system, because, according to Daft (2003), “a closed system would not depend on its environment; it would be autonomous, enclosed, and sealed off from the outside world” (p. 6). In a closed system, an organization would take the environment for granted, focus on its internal issues, and ignore changes in the external environment. Rather, an insurgent organization is an open system; that is, it “must interact with the environment to survive; it both consumes and exports resources to the environment” (p. 6). In an open system, an organization must adapt and adjust its activities and its transformation processes to changes in the environment.




Figure 1. Open system chart

Figure 1 illustrates a simple open system. Apart from their clandestine nature and covert activities, insurgent organizations share many common factors with modern organizations. As with every modern organization, insurgent organizations require inputs (recruits, food, material, information, etc.) to survive. The transformation process operates and converts these inputs to outputs or services. The feedback procedure provides adjustment and self-regulation both to the transformation and input-obtaining processes. In other words, the feedback procedure enables an organization to adapt itself to environmental changes in a continuous manner.

2. The Environment

An insurgent organization, as a part of an open system, must find and obtain inputs from the environment to survive. The organization cannot seal itself off from the environment nor can it ignore changes in the environment. This vital dependence of an insurgent organization on its environment compels it to interact with the environment and obliges it to seek ways or means to control and secure resources vital to survive.

Daft (2003) defines organizational environment as “all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization” (p. 50). Nevertheless, how can we define an element whether it is a part of the organization or a part of the external environment? Organizational boundaries do not exist in real life. They are abstract lines or zones drawn to express the limits or areas of responsibilities of an organization. The important criterion here is “control.” If an element is under control of the organization, it is within the boundaries of the organization.

The insurgent organization exports outputs and activities into the external environment. Analogous to economics, the organization acts as a supply system. By reducing the costs of its activities or increasing the scale and diversity of its services, an organization can manipulate the demand by its environment and expand its sphere of influence and its size. Similarly, the external environment acts as a demand system. It demands (receives) outputs that are decisions or services of the insurgent organization. This consumer-like behavior is a function of both supply and demand conditions. Leites and Wolf (1970) noted:

In the theory of consumer behavior, to revert to the economic analogy, it is customary to distinguish between the effect of consumer preferences (demand conditions) and the possibilities for buying different commodities as reflected by their relative costs (supply conditions). The interaction between them determines market behavior. (p. 28)

Nevertheless, in dealing with the insurgent problem, some theories focus on environmental factors and demand conditions, whereas others focus on organizational factors and supply conditions. The question of relative importance and primacy of environmental factors (vis-à-vis organizational factors) determines the basic differences

between different strategies that claim to solve insurgent problem. Leites and Wolf (1970) succinctly define the difference between the two approaches:

The supply side of the problem relates to the difficulty or cost of producing R's [Rebellion] activities; the higher these costs, the lower the scale or the probability of R. The demand side of the problem relates to what people are willing to pay (or contribute) for R's activities. The more they want an insurgency, the higher the price they will pay for these activities; hence, the greater the scale or the probability of R. (p. 37)

The environment surrounding an insurgent organization can be classified into two distinct parts. The inputs that an insurgent organization needs can be provided either from internal or external sources. The primacy and the relative importance of the internal sources (vis-à-vis external sources) may vary in different insurgencies or in different stages of an insurgency.

3. Constructing the Model

We can define "system" as a set of interacting elements. Three points are common to all systems as this study uses the term: first, there are objects or variables (both abstract and physical) within the system. Second, there are relationships between these variables that enable them to interact with each other. Third, systems exist in an environment.

The variables in an insurgent environment are: the insurgent organization, endogenous factors, exogenous factors, and the authority. In analyzing an insurgent movement, the most important variable is the insurgent organization. As Thompson (1969) notes "In a People's Revolutionary War . . . the primary weapon is . . . underground organization within the population" (p. 32). He further notes that "The underground organization within the population is initially parasitic in that it is extracting from the population (in competition with the government) men, supplies, and material" (p. 34). Despite the fact that insurgent organizations are clandestine organizations, they interact with the environment and share many characteristics with modern organizations.

To survive, an insurgent organization needs inputs of recruits, food, material, information, publicity, and money. Some of these inputs – mainly the basic needs such as people, food, and information – are obtained from the internal environment (endogeny),

while some others – diplomatic support, sophisticated weapons, organizational expertise, and finance – are provided by the external environment (exogeny).




Figure 2. Insurgency as a system ¹

To obtain sources from the internal environment, insurgents need the support of some portion of the population. The support of the population is vital to the insurgent organization, and insurgents use a variety of techniques, both coercive (threats, assassinations, sabotages) and persuasive (rewards, promotion, inducements), to gain the support of the population. The combination of these techniques may vary from one situation to another. Leites and Wolf (1970) note:

Coercion may be more effective in obtaining compliance from the “haves,” who initially are relatively favored and hence have something appreciable to lose; while persuasion and inducements may be more

¹ N. Leites and C. Wolf, Jr., After “Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts,” *The RAND Corporation* (1970): 35.

effective in obtaining compliance from the disadvantaged, who have little to lose and may therefore tend to cherish, and perhaps magnify, any gains by comparison. (p.33)

The inputs obtained from internal and external environments are transformed into outputs by the organization. To carry out these operations within the constraints of efficiency and security, insurgents develop a high level of specialization inside the organization. Insurgents establish a system of division of labor and “organize personnel, financial, logistics, intelligence, communication, and operations branches to manage the conversion of inputs into activities” (Leites & Wolf 1970, p. 34).

The outputs of the insurgent organization can be divided into two parts: destruction, that is, to destroy the government institutions and the stable image of government, and construction, that is, the establishment of parallel hierarchies and alternative institutions to the existing government structure. Destruction and construction are not separate or sequential processes; they usually go hand in hand.

The outputs also provide feedback to both the transformation and input-obtaining processes. The feedback mechanism enables the organization to adjust itself to the threats and changes in the environment. It also provides feedback regarding both endogeneity and exogeneity. The quality and content of the services and the activities that an insurgent organization provides determine the next pattern of inputs. Thus, an input-transformation-output cycle develops. The insurgent organization obtains inputs, transforms them, and exports activities to the environment; and, at the same time, these activities create demands for new inputs that are different in kind and degree. Consequently, an insurgent organization develops a self-regulating and self-sustaining character.

The systems approach to insurgency offers a number of benefits:

- (1) It provides a framework to identify and analyze an insurgency in a methodological way.
- (2) It ensures policy makers and theorists see insurgency in its entirety. Policy makers generally have a tendency to see only the outputs of an insurgency, which are the military activities of an insurgent organization. But, the outputs are only the most visible parts of an iceberg. Policy makers usually ignore the input-obtaining and conversion processes.

- (3) It provides a number of major variables by which to analyze an insurgency. The relationship between variables can also be identified.
- (4) The interactions between the inputs, conversion process, and outputs can be analyzed.

4. Major Variables of the System

The systems approach to insurgency provides us with the important variables that are effective in the evolution of an insurgency. After a thorough analysis of the systems approach, we can identify three major variables. The fourth variable, the “Authority,” is the subject of another chapter. The major variables in an insurgency are:

- (1) **Organization:** An insurgent organization is the driving force of an insurgency. The organization obtains inputs, transforms inputs into outputs, and exports those outputs to the environment.
- (2) **Support of the population (Endogeny):** Support of the population is vital for the survival of the organization. This support depends on preferences, attitudes, and behaviors of the people.
- (3) **External support (Exogeny):** An external source can provide critical support to an insurgency. It can provide moral, political, logistical, and financial support.

C. INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

1. Political Organization

Use of guerrilla tactics is not a product of the twentieth century; there have been many peasant rebellions, which used hit-and-run tactics against powerful enemies throughout history. What makes today’s insurgencies different from peasant rebellions of the past is the successful combination of political organization with the guerrilla tactics. Transitional societies provide great opportunities for organized movements to acquire power. As Samuel Huntington (1968) comments:

Organization is the road to political power. . . The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or by military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. Either the established elites compete among themselves to organize the masses through the

existing political system, or dissident elites organize them to overthrow that system. In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics. (p.461)

Unfortunately, there is a great tendency to see an insurgency as a problem of guerrilla forces or armed rebels in the jungles or mountains. Once targets are fixed as guerrillas, it is only natural to follow a strategy of large-scale counter-guerrilla operations. However, an insurgent organization operates on both political and military fronts. The military arm of an insurgent organization is only the most visible component of a much larger organization. Molnar (1966) rightly points out:

The structure of an insurgent or revolutionary movement is much like an iceberg. It has a relatively small visible element (guerrilla force) which is organized to perform overt armed operations, and a much larger clandestine, covert force (the underground). The underground carries on the vital activities of infiltration and political subversion; it establishes and operates shadow governments, and it acts as a support organization for the guerrillas. (p. 1)

Communist ideology provided an effective organizational structure for nationalist or communist-inspired insurgent movements. The success of communist-inspired movements is not due to inherent superiority of communism as an alternative to capitalism, but rather due to its political theory and an effective party system. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, there had been a number of communist and socialist insurrections against established regimes in Europe. Most of these insurrections ended with failure. It was only with Lenin that communist ideology acquired a capability to defeat a state and its security apparatus. Huntington (1968) aptly posits:

The strength of communism is found not in its economics. . . Its most relevant characteristic is its political theory and practice, not its Marxism but its Leninism. . . . The key to Marx is the social class; the key to Lenin is the political party. . . . Lenin . . . elevated a political institution, the party, over social classes and social forces. (p. 336)

Lenin laid the organizational foundations of a successful revolution in his 1902 pamphlet "What is to be Done?" Lenin (1902/1988) wrote that "only a party that will organize truly nation-wide exposure can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces" (p. 153). Obviously, Lenin's party was far from a Western-style political party-not only in its specific goals, but also in its organizational structure. As Philip Selznick

(1952) claims, “Bolshevism calls for the *continuous* conquest of power through full use of the potentialities of organization” (p. 17). Unlike other political parties, the Bolshevik party sought power in both legitimate and illegitimate areas, and it did not stop until it acquired total power. The function of that political organization was to mobilize the resources of its members and to transform them into an effective instrument of struggle. The nature and characteristics of that revolutionary organization are summarized by Lenin (1902/1988):

I assert: (1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organization of leaders maintaining continuity; (2) that the broader the popular mass drawn spontaneously into the struggle, which forms the basis of the movement and participates in it, the more urgent the need for such an organization, and the more solid this organization must be . . . (3) that such an organization must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state, the more we *confine* the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to unearth the organization. (pp. 185-6)

Like other modern organizations, an insurgent organization permanently interacts with its environment; it obtains inputs, operates and transforms these inputs into outputs, and exports these outputs as services or activities into the environment. To achieve efficiency in a hostile environment, there must be a division of labor and a certain degree of specialization within the insurgent organization. Different tasks must be performed by different branches, committees, or cells.

Prior to the beginning of hostilities, an insurgent organization is almost completely an underground organization. At this stage, military and political leadership will most likely be in the hands of a single authority. As the organization grows, political and military components are divided, but always very closely coordinated, with the military component almost always subordinate to the political leadership. The military component, either guerrilla forces or regular army, presents the visible side of an insurgency. Nevertheless, the political organization and military organization are not separate entities. They usually are intertwined. The tasks of the military component are already well known: small-scale attacks, raids, ambushes, conventional attacks, etc.

The political organization of an insurgency is the driving force of an insurgency. Apart from exporting outputs in an open system, most of the tasks involved in obtaining inputs and conversion are conducted by the political organization. It takes years, if not decades, to build a political organization up to a point where it can successfully wage a war. As Thompson (1969) posits, “The whole success of an insurgent movement depends . . . almost entirely on the underground organization” (p. 33). If the guerrilla force is the fist of a revolution, then, political organization will be the brain that commands that fist. Thompson writes:

If that (underground organization] is like a virus within the body politic of the country then the guerrilla units, which are open to manifestations of disease, will be spreading and erupting all over the surface of the country. This explains why an insurgent movement as a whole can expand, although heavy casualties may be inflicted on guerrilla units by military operations. (p. 33)

A political organization may operate openly as a legal party or it may be completely clandestine. The political organization of an insurgency is usually a “hierarchical structure, rising from a base of cells, through branches, districts, states, or provinces to national headquarters” (Molnar, 1966, p.19). The leadership cadres are the highly dedicated, full time workers of the organization. The cadres are the nerve cells of the organization; without them the organization would be paralyzed.

A political organization performs a variety of activities both as a supplementary role to the guerrilla force and as a part of a broader political struggle. A political organization of an insurgent movement carries out the following functions (Molnar, 1966, p. 19):

- (1) Recruits and trains members (input-obtaining and conversion process)
- (2) Obtains finances and supplies (input-obtaining)
- (3) Establishes caches for both the underground and guerrilla forces (inputs and conversion process)
- (4) Conducts terrorist and psychological operations (outputs)
- (5) Tries to win the people’s support for the movement (conversion process)
- (6) Collects intelligence (input-obtaining)

- (7) Conducts sabotages (outputs)
- (8) Establishes shadow governments and controls the population. (conversion process)

The activities of a political organization and relative primacy of these activities during a protracted conflict vary with the phase of development of the insurgent movement. Some tactics may be conducted in one phase, whereas the use these same tactics may be denounced in another phase. For instance, terror tactics, assassinations, and sabotage are generally used in the early phases of an insurgency, but as the organization grows and proceeds to upper phases of development, conventional tactics will be used more and more often, and at the same time, terrorist activities will be strictly limited. Molnar (1966) proposes a five-phase organizational development of an insurgent movement:

- Phase one: “the *clandestine organization phase*, the underground begins by setting up cells, recruiting, training, and testing cadres, infiltrating key industrial labor unions and national organizations, establishing external support, and establishing a base in a safe area.” Once ordinary or half-hearted members of the organization became fully-committed cadres, and the structure of the organization is established, then the insurgent movement is ready to proceed to the next phase.
- Phase two: “*psychological offensive phase*, the underground capitalizes upon dissatisfaction and a desire for change by creating unrest and disorder and by exploiting tension created by social, economic, and political differences.” In this phase, the insurgents organize mass demonstrations and strikes and create an atmosphere of chaos. Through agitation and propaganda teams, the insurgent organization attempts to weaken and sever the ties between the society and the authority. Social grievances are exploited and exaggerated by spreading rumors and through propaganda. Ineptitude of the existing authority is demonstrated in every opportunity. The main political objective of the insurgent

organization, in this phase, is to disrupt the stable image of the established regime.

- Phase three: “*expansion phase*, after its disruptive activities create unrest and uncertainty, the movement seeks to crystallize public support for a strong organization that will restore order.” The insurgents attempt to infiltrate into mass organizations and government institutions and subvert them. The insurgent organization changes its administrative and operational tactics and procedures. The organization transforms itself from a small, secret, underground organization into a mass, popular organization.
- Phase four: “*militarization phase*,” focuses on overt guerrilla activities and armed struggle.
- Phase five and final phase: “*consolidation phase*.” The insurgent organization establishes political institutions in the areas under its control, and continues to create shadow governments in contested areas. (pp. 28-32)

It must be recognized that none of these phases have strict time limitations, nor are there any tangible separations between different phases. Mostly, phases overlap each other; the phases symbolize the predominant activity at that period. For example, in the militarization phase, the predominant activity is overt armed struggle against the security forces of the authority, but subversive activities, agitation, and propaganda activities in the earlier phases are not abandoned. Additionally, there is no uniform character to how to develop; the insurgent organization may be in different phases in different regions of the country.

2. Military Organization

An insurgent organization operates both in the political and military areas. The object of the political organization is to gain the contest over the population both by establishing a control mechanism and a shadow government and by destroying the government infrastructure. The primary object of the military organization is erroneously perceived to be fighting and destroying the armed forces of the existing authority.

Although the military forces of the insurgent organization (local units, guerrilla forces, or regular forces) do fight against the security forces, fighting the enemy is not their primary aim. Fighting must be seen as a means to achieve the primary objectives of the insurgent movement, not as an end in itself. Insurgents do not fight to destroy the enemy army, of which they are thoroughly incapable anyway, but rather they fight to agitate and organize the masses and “to establish a competitive system of control over the population” (Fall, 1964, p. 210).

To achieve the objectives of the insurgent organization, the military organization is generally organized as three different major forces. At the village level, there are local forces that are responsible for self-defense of the village and enforcement of party rule. These village militias are recruited from local people to fight against the existing government. They also support the insurgent infrastructure at the village level. Giap (1962) recapitulated four major tasks for these self-defense units: “to replenish the permanent army, to maintain security and protect production, to serve the front-line, and to carry out guerrilla activities” (p. 143). After a village is taken over by the insurgent organization, insurgents push for establishing barricades, booby-traps, and defensive positions and transform the village into a “combat village.” Once the villagers support the military activities of the insurgents, it becomes a target for the government troops. Explaining how Communists alienated the people from the government and gained the support of the population in a Vietnamese village, Molnar (1966) writes:

The more the villagers were pressed by the Communists into building defenses, the more government troops came to clean up the rebel “stronghold” (even though no guerrillas were there). The Communists had maneuvered the village into “defending” itself from its own government. Inevitably, the more government troops attacked, the more the people turned against the government and toward the Communists. The axiom that “people learn war through war” became a fateful truism: whereas the villagers were once reluctant and hesitant in their military support of the Communists, they now had a vested interest in supporting the guerrilla units and protecting the village from the government. (p. 62)

The second major type of force is guerrilla forces in the regional or district level. If the guerrilla organization is set up according to the principles of Mao Zedong, the guerrilla forces are organized along geographical lines. These geographical areas are

called “military areas” and these areas are subdivided into smaller districts in accordance with local geography, the enemy situation locally, and the state of the guerrilla movement. Each district is subdivided into two to six counties. To establish control and coordination of military operations and local political affairs, “a committee of seven to nine should be organized in each area and district.” The guerrilla forces in the counties, districts, and military areas are organized as platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades. Each unit has a military leader, a political leader, and an assistant leader. Political leaders are assigned to “carry on political propaganda work.” (Mao, 1937/1960, pp. 77-80)

Although such guerrilla organizations are set up along principles similar to those of Western military organizations, there are significant differences both organizationally and operationally. Unlike regular forces, the guerrilla organization has a much simpler form. Guerrilla forces usually operate in small units, mostly of platoon or company-size. Small unit leaders are encouraged to demonstrate initiative and take independent action. There is a heavy emphasis on political indoctrination. Mao (1966) wrote that “The fighting capacity of a guerrilla unit is not determined exclusively by military arts, but depends above all on political consciousness” (p. 130). To achieve that level of political consciousness, Mao claims:

Each guerrilla task group and small group should have a political director, and in the headquarters of the guerrilla unit there should be a political training department for directing the political work of officers and soldiers and dealing with the human problems of all the political instructors. (p. 77)

The third major force is the regular force at the provincial or national level. These regular forces are “created and organized along conventional lines, but remain mobile and use guerrilla paramilitary forces as a protective screen” (Molnar, 1966, p. 51). Mao never saw guerrilla warfare as a decisive form of warfare. Mao (1937/1961) wrote that “We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle” (p. 42). As the insurgent movement grows, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. The

regular army of the insurgent organization operates as an “army-in-being.” In replying criticisms for having different military organizations, Mao claimed:

Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the main operations of the people’s guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man’s right arm and left arm; and, if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people’s guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. (Molnar, 1966, p. 96)

Although the military component of an insurgent organization is a separate entity, its activities are closely coordinated with the political objectives of the insurgent movement. In fact, in conventional communist organizations, the military component is always under close scrutiny and control of the political party via political commissars in every unit.

3. Subversion, Establishment of Shadow Governments, and Parallel Hierarchies

A distinguished expert on insurgency, Bernard Fall (1964), properly posited that “When a country is being subverted, it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered” (p. 220). The insurgency is mainly a contest for gaining control over the civilian population. The aim is not to outfought the armed forces of the Authority, but to outadminister the civilian government through subversive activities. As long as insurgents successfully continue to subvert key institutions, organizations, or individuals, they can keep on fighting. Thompson (1966) emphasized the importance of subversive activities for the survival of an insurgent organization and wrote that “Insurgency is a measure both of the success and of the failure of subversion” (p. 28). Subversion is the gradual establishment of an insurgent administrative structure for managing the population.

Insurgent organizations endeavor to eliminate, neutralize, or win control of key institutions. For instance, infiltration of key industries and workers’ unions allows an insurgent organization to divert and manipulate the activities of these organizations. “The objectives in infiltrating mass organizations are (1) to neutralize existing agencies which support the government; (2) to justify and legitimize causes which can be exploited by the subversives; and (3) to mobilize mass support” (Molnar, 1966, p. 45). To gain control of mass organizations, insurgents use leadership tactics, membership tactics, and a system

of rewards and sanctions. If an insurgent organization fails to infiltrate or take control of existing organizations, it “creates organizations which serve as an innocent façade to its actual work” (Molnar, 1963, p.92). These front groups adopt a legitimate issue or a social problem and attempt to win support from key individuals in the society. By enlisting important figures and championing a worthy cause, the organization seeks to grow and claim legitimacy in addressing the needs of the society. The insurgents also use “united front” tactics to “draw a number of legitimate groups into a united front, and thus gain the prestige of speaking for a larger group of people” (Molnar, 1963, p.92).

The ultimate aim of the political organization is to overthrow the existing government and impose its authority. To achieve this aim, the political organization establishes a shadow government and parallel hierarchy. Bard O’Neill (1990) articulates the different ways to establish parallel hierarchy:

The parallel hierarchy can take several forms. One is the use of existing government political-administrative institutions through the infiltration of insurgent agents.

A more familiar form of parallel hierarchy, one that goes beyond infiltration, is the creation of political structures or institutions to administer, organize, and rule the population in the areas controlled by the insurgents (“liberated zones”). They also challenge the government in contested areas by establishing small, secretive cells that will carefully proceed with tasks of assessing the insurrectionary potential of the people and recruiting followers and supporters. (pp. 91-2)

Establishment of a parallel hierarchy and shadow government is an important step in acquiring power. Greene (1984) argues that “The effectiveness of revolutionary organization and the likelihood of success increase as the movement is able to develop institutions that actually function as agencies of government” (p. 121). Typically, insurgents start establishing agencies or symbols of government such as schools, courts, or medical facilities in remote villages where little or no governmental control exists. By broadening their support base, insurgents gradually replace the existing authority and impose their own authority. Molnar (1966) sums up how insurgents gradually replace the incumbent regime:

The shadow government parallels local governmental structures. Through the systematic removal or assassination of government officials, and through agitation and propaganda, official government control is eroded and replaced by new institutions. (p. 60)

It is important to note that an insurgent organization is not only about destruction of the existing authority. Insurgency strategy is to build as well as to as to disrupt. “Destruction” and “construction” usually goes hand in hand. By establishing a parallel hierarchy and shadow government, the insurgents develop new, political institutions and new symbols of authority that serve as instruments for population control. Insurgents develop institutions “such as rural courts, youth leagues, schools, and farmer cooperatives to exert normative and regulatory control over individuals, and reinforce this control with coercive means such as surveillance, threats, and physical punishments.” (Molnar, 1966, p. 60)

D. POPULAR SUPPORT

In an insurgency, the contest is for the control of the population. The insurgents’ aim is to break the ties between the incumbent regime and the population, while establishing and strengthening its own ties with the population. Insurgents obtain supplies, recruits, intelligence, and shelter from the population. If the flow of vital inputs from the local population stops or slows down, the insurgent organization cannot operate and produce the activities that it should. Without at least some degree of sympathy from some portion of the population, insurgents cannot survive. Galula (1964) claims:

If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit support of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. (pp. 7-8)

Galula was neither the only nor the first person to emphasize the role of the population in an insurgency. Long before, T. E. Lawrence (1926) noted that his rebellion in Arabia “had a friendly population, of which two out of one hundred were active, and the rest quietly sympathetic to the point of not betraying the movements of the minority” (p. 196). Insurgents do not necessarily need the support of the majority of the population. A small, but dedicated group of followers will be enough - at least at the commencement of hostilities.

As Lawrence pointed out, the support of the population can be divided into two parts: active support - which includes people who work for the cause (full-time or part-time) and participate in activities of the organization, and passive support - which includes “people who quietly sympathize with the insurgents, but are not willing to provide material assistance” (O’Neill, 1990, p.71). O’Neill cites a Vietminh manual which summarizes the importance of active support:

Without the “popular antennae,” we would be without information; without the protection of the people we could neither keep our secrets nor execute quick movement; without the people, the guerrillas could neither attack the enemy nor replenish their forces, and in consequence, they could not accomplish their mission with ardor and speed. . . .

The population helps us to fight the enemy by giving us information, suggesting ruses and plans, helping us to overcome difficulties due to lack of arms. . . . Cooperating with guerrillas, it has participated in sabotage acts, in diversionary actions, in encircling the enemy, and in applying the scorched earth policy. . . . On several occasions and in cooperation with guerrillas, it has taken part in combat. (p. 72)

Although the role of the passive side of the population (the role of “the silent majority”) seems unimportant or inconsequential to the outcome of a revolution, the quality of the attitudes of the majority of the population is important to the insurgent organization. Insurgents cannot live in a hostile environment. As Leites and Wolf (1970) write “The only ‘act’ that R [rebellion] needs desperately from a large proportion of population is *nondenunciation* (that is, eschewing the act of informing against R) and noncombat against it” (p. 10). Insurgents do not necessarily need the sympathy of a large portion of the population; a small, dedicated group of supporters, whose commitments to the insurgent cause are absolute, is enough to sustain the movement. Nevertheless, an insurgent organization cannot operate in an unfriendly environment if the local population is overtly hostile to the insurgents and cooperates with the government.

But, how can an insurgent organization gain the support of the population? Or, more importantly, how do insurgents secure the flow of vital inputs to the organization regardless of its popularity? Insurgents use a number of techniques to gain the support of the population or to establish a system of social control. Parsons (1964) suggests that there are four types of social control. These are: “the offer of positive advantages” or

“inducement” using the media of economic exchange; “the threat of disadvantage” or “coercion” using the media of power; the use of “persuasion” using the media of influence and transmission of information (explaining why the target should comply and cooperate); and “the activation of commitments” or “the appeal to conscience” (p. 39).

Of these four types of social control Parsons suggests “inducement” and “persuasion” constitute positive sanctions, while “coercion” and “activation of commitments” represent negative sanctions. In his renowned book, *The Prince*, Machiavelli (1513/1966) answers the question “whether it is better to be loved or feared: The answer is, of course, that it would be best to be both loved and feared. But since the two rarely come together, anyone compelled to choose will find greater security in being feared than being loved” (p. 66). As Machiavelli demonstrated, it is commonly believed that fear is a greater factor than love in affecting one’s behavior. Adapting Machiavelli’s dictum to our situation, the question arises as to whether negative incentives (coercion) or positive incentives (rewards, economic improvement projects, inducements, persuasion) are more useful for influencing behavior. The answer is, of course, that it would be best to use both positive and negative incentives. Nevertheless, even in the carrot-and-stick approach, not all carrots and sticks are equal. When it comes to gaining the support of the population, some experts in the field focus on positive sanctions: the use of economic development projects or propaganda to persuade people that cooperating with the government is to their benefit. At the same time, other experts focus on negative sanctions, mainly the use of coercion, and claim that individuals act rationally and make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis in which coercive sanctions have a primacy and dominance over the positive sanctions of social control.

1. The Effect of Coercion as an Instrument of Gaining the Support of the Population

Although the term “popular support” denotes popular likes and dislikes of the civilian populace, the support of the population is not only a function of the preferences or the sympathy of the population. People’s sympathy may not guarantee compliance with the demands of either the Authority or the Rebellion. It is widely known that insurgent organizations use persuasive techniques as well as coercive techniques to gain the support of the population. Galula (1964) appropriately writes:

The complicity of the population is not to be confused with the sympathy of the population; the former is active, the latter inactive, and the popularity of the population of the insurgent's cause is insufficient by itself to transform sympathy into complicity. The participation of the population is obtained, above all, by a political organization (the party) living among the population, backed by force (guerrilla gangs), which eliminates the open enemies, intimidates the potential ones, and relies on those among the population who actively supports the insurgents. Persuasion brings a minority of supporters – they are indispensable – but force rallies the rest. (p. 50)

We can define coercion as threatening to use force if a target individual, group, or population conducts an undesired act or fails to act in a desired way. According to Parsons (1967), there are three different sets of intentions in using force: “*deterrence* from undesired action, *punishment* for negatively valued acts actually committed, and symbolic *demonstration* of capacity to act, without orientation to specific contexts of either deterrence or intention to punish” (p. 35).

In some cases, the “deterrence effect” of coercion is more important than the “punishment” or the “demonstration effect.” It can be argued that “punishment” and “demonstration acts” are performed to maintain the credibility of the “threat” so that in the future the actor can enforce his will without use of force.

Of course, it is quite difficult to predict an individual's response to a threat; different individuals respond to the same threats in different ways. As Tinker (1969) posits “Behavior patterns are affected to a large extent by personality and previously established behavior patterns” (p. 215). Apart from personality variables, the clarity of the content of a threat seems to be an important factor:

Human response to threat . . . varies according to the nature of the threatening situation – whether it is specific or uncertain. . . . Where threat is clearly defined as and specifically communicated to an individual, with demands, alternatives, and consequences apparent and persuasively stated, an individual's reaction is probably based upon a relatively clear assessment of known variables and he may comply out of fear of having the threat carried out. (Tinker, 1969, p. 216)

Nevertheless, an actor intentionally may issue an unclear, vague threat. Tinker (1969) further distinguishes between “anxiety” responses caused by unclear, vague threats and “fear” responses that are caused by clear, specific threats:

Fear is apt to produce a prompt reaction either to remove the object of fear from oneself or oneself from the object of fear, whereas anxiety “is chronic and vague . . . one does not know quite what is the cause of his anxiety and, partly for that reason, he does not quite know what to do.” Thus, “the more specific the threat, the more fear-inducing it is; the more vague the threat, the more anxiety-inducing it is” – making an individual hypersensitive to ordinarily neutral situations and causing disruptive behavior. (p. 216)

Whether a threat is specific or unclear is one of the factors that helps us to understand the human behavior under threat. Another factor that influences an individual’s response to a threat is the severity and proximity of danger. If a villager has to decide between conflicting threats, he calculates the costs and opportunities available to him. If one of the threats entails his imprisonment, while another involves physical punishment, destruction of his house and farm, or even death of a close relative or loss of his own life, it should not be difficult for him to choose between the threats. Along with these lines, Leites and Wolf (1970) cite an event in the Algerian War:

An old Muslim, arrested for having sawed off telegraph poles, explains to a captain who expresses surprise about his deed: “Sir, the French came and tell me: you mustn’t saw off poles; if you do, you go to prison. I say to myself: I don’t want to go to prison, I won’t do it. The French leave. At night, the rebel comes and says: saw off poles from here to there. I answer: no, the French would put me into prison. The rebel tells me: You cut the poles or I cut your throat. I calculate: If I don’t cut the poles, he’ll surely cut my throat; he has done it to others in the next village. I prefer going to prison. So, Sir, I cut the poles; you caught me; put me in prison!” (pp. 128-9)

As a natural response to the understanding that the more severe side can impose its will, one side may decide to increase the severity of its punishments. Nevertheless, even in death, the ultimate punishment that an actor can exert on a target, some forms of death are preferable to others. In post-war Iraq, insurgents have used media extensively to show videos of the beheading of captured persons. Even though the videos have caused a loss of sympathy for the insurgents’ cause, they have a tremendous effect on the people of Iraq and have sent a strong message to the people who cooperate with the Coalition Forces. An Iraqi civilian may have sympathy for the long-term aims of the Coalitional Provisional Authority and may hate the insurgents, but comparing the available options,

he may not have the luxury of making decisions based on his sympathies or dislikes. Leites and Wolf (1970) cited a French officer serving in Algeria who recalls what occurred at election time:

Muslims came to me and said: We are coming to see you, but we shall not vote. If we did, we would have our throats cut. You can kill us with your gun; it's more agreeable to die that way than by the knife. (p. 129)

Cultural factors are also important in the outcome of human behavior under threat. In some cultures, loss of honor may be a more important factor than loss of life in influencing one's decision. In others, superstitious beliefs in black magic, afterlife, or curses may affect the perception of threat. Tinker (1969) writes:

In Angola, it is believed that a mutilated body cannot enjoy an afterlife. The Angolan administration capitalized on this fear during the 1961 rebellion. While the tribesmen "will occasionally charge fearlessly into a barrage of machine gun fire," reports one writer, "they will think twice about attacking anyone armed with a machete." (p. 219)

Besides the severity of a threat and the importance of cultural factors in shaping perceptions about it, the immediacy or proximity of a threat or danger is also an important factor in influencing an individual's decision. An individual under two different sets of conflicting threats will surely try to avoid the most imminent threat and then think of the distant threat. The probability of implementation of an imminent threat is almost certain, whereas, the probability of a distant threat is low. Even if a villager complies with the demands of insurgents under coercion, government forces may not learn about his deeds, he may have a chance to avoid punishment, and even if he is caught, assuming that government forces operate under the rule of law, his punishment will probably be more lenient. In Iraq, the likelihood of winning the war for the Coalitional Forces may be high in the long term, and that fact may influence the feelings or calculations of an individual, but facing an imminent threat from the insurgents, he may not have the luxury of making long-term strategic plans. Leites and Wolf (1970) argue:

The time horizon over which the calculations of this hypothetical and rational *decisionmaking* unit extends may be extremely short. The need to avoid today's damage may overwhelm considerations of long-run preference, or cumulative long-run gain, associated with a different course of action. (p. 43)

The key consideration for the insurgents regarding the population is behavior, not necessarily attitudes or preferences. It is quite clear that attitude and behavior are not the same things. While attitudes reflect sympathy or a general feeling toward someone, behavior includes both attitudes and assisted preferences; that is, selective incentives, which can affect one's behavior through positive and negative incentives, combined with expectations regarding the credibility of both positive and negative incentives. In other words, behavior is a function of both attitudes and opportunities at hand. In manipulating an individual's behavior, an Authority can put emphasis on influencing either the attitudes or the opportunities that an individual faces. Leites and Wolf (1970) claim that analyzing opportunities may be more rewarding than preferences for two reasons:

The first is that opportunities are more readily and reliably observable than preferences. . . . The second reason is that the particular set of preferences to which the behavior of the population is relevant may have relatively little to do with sympathy for, or identification with, either contesting side – the insurgents or the authority. . . . limiting damage or enhancing gain may be a sufficient explanation for the behavior of the population, without recourse to more elusive explanations concerning putative preferences or sympathies. (p. 42)

Coercive sanctions have a more direct and quick effect, whereas persuasion and inducement have an indirect and long-term effect on individuals. In order to bring a swift end to a struggle, both sides in an insurgency can employ coercion as an instrument of population control. Although coercion is an effective tool in manipulating an individual's short-term decisions, it may cause serious problems in the long-term. Gurr (1970) argues:

If men anticipate severe and certain retribution for prescribed actions they are likely to restrain their anger in the short run. In the long run, if they think their motives for action are legitimate, they will attempt to get the means – comrades, organization, arms – to counter the severity and certainty of regime sanctions. The inference is that the more severe and certain are unjustified actions, the greater the extent of ultimate political violence. (p. 238)

An Authority may not use coercive techniques as freely and effectively as an insurgent group does. Shultz (1978) argues that “A regime’s coercive sanctions often tend to facilitate rather than inhibit political violence. . . . Excessive regime reliance on coercion and force alienates the population, driving them to the side of the insurgents” (p. 113). Gurr (1970) complies with Shultz and argues:

Force threatens and angers men, especially if they believe it to be illicit or unjust. . . . the presumption justifying counterforce is that it deters: the greater a regime’s capacity for force and the more severe the sanctions it imposes on dissidents, the less violence they will do. This assumption is often a self-defeating fallacy. If a regime responds to the threat or use of force with greater force, the effect is likely to be an intensification of resistance: dissidents will resort to greater force. (p. 232)

However, if an Authority decides to use coercion to obtain compliance, it must be effective and selective in its implementation of coercive sanctions. Repression is usually a double-edged sword; it can both decrease and increase the level of violence depending on the situation and the quality of government response. Eckstein (1965) appropriately writes:

Unless it [repression] is based upon extremely good intelligence, and unless its application is sensible, ruthless, and continuous, its effects may be quite opposite to those intended. Incompetent repression leads to a combination of disaffection and contempt for the elite. Also, repression may only make the enemies of a regime more competent in the arts of conspiracy; certainly it tends to make them more experienced in the skills of clandestine organization and *sub rosa* [secret] communication. (p. 154)

Incompetent and inefficient regimes are more likely to instigate than impede the level of violence when they use coercion. Since they lack an effective administrative, judicial, and security infrastructure, they cannot obtain compliance with low levels of coerciveness and, at the same time, they cannot enforce high levels of coerciveness. The result is, mostly, inefficient use of coercive sanctions, which causes more contempt and hatred towards the regime. Gurr (1968) argues:

Low coerciveness is not frustrating and moderate coerciveness is more likely to frustrate than deter, while only the highest levels of coerciveness are sufficient to inhibit men from civil violence.

The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary curvilinearly with the amount of physical or social retribution anticipated as a consequence of participation in it, with likelihood and magnitude greatest at medium levels of retribution. (p. 265)

Analyzing the factors that proved influential in recruitment based on statistical data from captured insurgents in Vietnam and in the Philippines, Molnar (1966) concluded:

Coercion alone did not seem to be a large factor (20 to 23 percent) in either the Huks or Vietminh. Coercion combined with other positive incentives related to personal and situational factors, however, accounted for a larger proportion of joiners (33 to 48 percent).” (p. 79)

To conclude, although coercion is an important factor in gaining the support of the population, it is not sufficient alone. It is difficult to estimate the reactions of individuals to coercion, and short-term gains may be deceptive. A discriminate and selective use of coercion, which requires an effective intelligence capability to discriminate innocent people from insurgents, combined with positive sanctions of social control, will probably be much more effective than a pure coercion approach.

2. The Use of Economic Improvement Projects as an Instrument of Social Control

A popular argument about the relationship between economic conditions and rebellion is that poverty and unequal distribution of wealth are the driving forces of a rebellion. The popular argument assumes that poor people, who have less to lose, no jobs, and not a very promising future, tend to revolt, whereas relatively well-to-do people tend to stay within the system since they have expectations for the future and have much to lose from a rebellion. Thus, it is assumed, if the living conditions of the people are improved, the likelihood of a rebellion breaking out will be less. The proponents of this argument advocate economic improvement projects in order to raise the economic standards of the people.

Others argue that economic development may not always bring stability and peace, but, to the contrary, may serve as a facilitator of revolution. One and a half centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville (1856/1955) wrote:

It was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. This may seem illogical – but history is full of such paradoxes. For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. (p. 176)

Analyzing a set of data on the relationship between economic development and the outbreak, success, and failure of an insurgency in 24 insurgencies, Molnar (1966) argues:

A country's stage of economic development provides no immunity to insurgency. With the exception of the few mass-consumption societies, insurgency has occurred in countries at all levels of economic development. While economic factors may be more important when considered on a local or regional basis or subgroups within a nation, neither gross national product per capita nor GNP per capita increase is related to outbreak or the success of the insurgency. (p. 73)

The question is whether economic development programs increase the popular support for the Authority and hinder the insurgents or whether they enhance the resources available to insurgents and thus help the insurgents to grow. The proponents of economic development programs argue that these programs provide employment, food, education, in short, better living standards, and thus, make people less susceptible to insurgent propaganda and appeals. Yet, as Leites and Wolf (1970) note:

Economic improvement programs, while they *may* affect the preferences of the populace, as between A [Authority] and R [Rebellion], *will* influence the resources available to the population. Even if an individual's preference for A is increased, the fact that he commands additional income as a result of economic improvement enables him to use some of this increased income to "buy" his security or protection from R, thereby making him feel that he is improving his chances of survival. Even if the population toward R – short of an unlikely intensity of hostility that might lead to denouncing and combating R – both the population and R can benefit from economic improvement effects undertaken by A. (p. 19)

One way to address the dilemma of increasing economic conditions and avoiding helping the growth of insurgents may be the selective implementation of these programs. Leites and Wolf (1970) noted that in order to "make the increased income depend on behavior" desired by the Authority, "the relative price of undesirable behavior should be

made to rise, with a resulting tendency to substitute desirable for undesirable behavior” (p. 20). In other words, an Authority may “allocate these projects to those who cooperate but not to those who do not” (p. 27). Nevertheless, the implementation of this selective use of economic improvement projects requires an information and intelligence capability that helps an Authority to distinguish between those who cooperate and those who do not. Also, economic development projects that do not provide security to the population and do not destroy the underground component of the insurgent organization within the population, are more likely to fail.

E. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

1. Importance of External Support

Insurgent organizations, as operating systems, need inputs to transform and convert into outputs. Some of these inputs – mainly food, clothes, recruits, and information – will be obtained from domestic sources, while some others – weapons, political support, finance, organizational expertise – will be provided by external sources. The relationship between domestic factors and external support has differed considerably among insurgencies. Some insurgencies failed despite abundant external help, while some others succeeded despite a lack of significant outside assistance.

During the 1960s and 1970s it was commonly assumed that many insurgencies in the third world were provoked, financed, planned, and directed by the Communist Bloc – mainly Moscow or China. In fact, many of these movements – though not all of them – were national liberation movements against a colonial power. The roots of these third world insurgencies were mainly domestic; economic deprivation, ethnic and religious differences, resentment against the colonial suppression, and humiliation pushed many indigenous movements into rebellion.

Although many insurgencies benefited from outside help, it is difficult to gauge the importance and role of external help in the general outcome of the insurgency. As a Rand Study by Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001) noted, “Insurgents seek externally what they cannot acquire internally” (p. 104). The study also shows the relative importance of different forms of outside assistance for different insurgencies:

One movement may need a haven; another, weapons; and a third, political support. The value of these types of support thus varies with the particular requirements of the insurgent movements. Moreover, the value of external support depends heavily on the existing strength of a movement. Money given to a poor insurgent movement often has a greater impact than money given to a wealthy one. Similarly, strong insurgencies may receive more support than weaker ones, but the support has only a marginal benefit to the strong, while it may be essential to the weaker group. Because the importance of outside support is also relative, the scale of this support does not always correspond with its significance to the insurgency. (p. 104)

The importance of outside assistance to the ultimate outcome of an insurgency caused debates between the experts in the field. Galula (1964) argued that “No outside support is absolutely necessary at the start of an emergency, although it obviously helps when available” (p. 42). On the other hand, some others claim that without the existence of an external source of help, an insurgency cannot succeed. For instance, Bard O’Neill (1990) posits that “Unless governments are utterly incompetent, devoid of political will, and lacking resources, insurgent organizations normally must obtain outside assistance if they are to succeed” (p. 111).

While there are different opinions on the relative importance of external factors (vis-à-vis the domestic factors), the priority remains on the domestic factors. As Ney (Osanka, 1962, chap. 3) claims, “While the modern guerrilla depends increasingly upon the international community for military aid and diplomatic support, he must rely almost exclusively on the local community for all the immediate necessities of war – food, clothing, shelter, funds, cover, and intelligence” (p. 32). An insurgent movement can survive without outside assistance, but it cannot survive without the protection and collaboration of the people inside the country. Leites and Wolf (1970) argued:

While substantial exogeny is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful R [Rebellion], an ambiguous history seems to suggest that R has never been suppressed until external help has previously been terminated. R may win without external support; A [Authority] is unlikely to win if R continues to receive it. (p. 24)

To conclude, outside assistance is an important factor in the development of an insurgency, but it is neither a vital factor nor sufficient to sustain an insurgency without the help of domestic factors. Although the existence of external support helps an

insurgent organization, it may still succeed without any substantial amount of external aid. To the contrary, if a government wants to defeat an insurgent problem, it must prevent the flow of sources and militants from a neighboring country. The objective of the government must be to deny the insurgents free space in which to maneuver. If insurgents continue to have base areas outside the country, and the Authority fails to prevent infiltration of supplies and militants through the borders, the effects of successful military operations in denying free space to insurgents inside the country will be limited.

2. The Sources and Forms of External Support

Insurgent organizations receive different forms of external support from different sources. The stage of an insurgency is also an important factor in the form of external support that an insurgent movement requires. In the initial phases of an insurgency, an insurgent organization may need a safe haven to organize and train its forces but may not need heavy weapon systems since its military activities will be confined to small-scale activities. The requirements of an insurgent organization will change through the development of the insurgency movement. As Byman et al. (2001) posit “The value of outside support depends upon the requirements of the insurgency, its ability to acquire what it needs domestically, the strength of the state, and other factors that vary with each movement” (p. xvii).

Throughout the Cold War, it was assumed that insurgent organizations were assisted, trained, and directed by other states, mainly by one of the two superpowers or by a neighboring country. Although the end of the Cold War caused a decrease in the amount of help that the United States and Russia provided to insurgent organizations, state support continues to be an important source of external support. With less superpower assistance, neighboring states have gained importance and provided external help. State support for an insurgency has a profound effect on the development of an insurgent movement.

Scott (1970) argues that “Unless the prospects of an insurgent movement are reasonably good, a foreign government may see no reason to provide it with aid and jeopardize relations with the incumbent government” (pp. 77-8). Supporting an insurgent movement in another country involves some risks for a foreign government that can jeopardize its own national security. States support insurgent movements based on

rational decisions rather than sympathy for the insurgent cause. Byman et al. (2001) wrote that “States supporting insurgencies are primarily motivated by geopolitics rather than ideology, ethnic affinity, or religious sentiment” (p. xiv). In other words, states use insurgent organizations as an instrument of their foreign policies to realize their own objectives.

The motivations of states supporting insurgencies vary with the foreign policy goals of the supporting state, the relationship between two countries, and the nature and goals of the insurgent movement. One motivation for foreign governments to support insurgencies is to “increase local or regional influence, particularly along their borders, and especially as a means of applying pressure on a rival” (Byman et al., 2001, p. 23). Another motivation is to destabilize neighboring countries in which insurgent movements are seen as “an alternative and a less-direct means of weakening or undermining enemies or rivals” (p. 32). There are other motivations for states supporting insurgent movements: to overthrow a government and foster regime change, to retaliate because of support from a foreign country to an insurgent movement inside its own boundaries, or to support co-ethnics or co-religionists in another country.

With the end of the Cold War, new sources of external support gained importance. State support for insurgencies is no longer the “only” or most important source of external support. Byman et al. (2001) stated:

Diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or other important forms of support. (p. xiii)

Insurgent organizations often seek and establish bonds with immigrant societies in foreign countries. Unlike state supporters of an insurgent organization, these immigrant communities support insurgent causes due to religious or ethnic affinity. Since the support from diasporas is not benefit or profit oriented. It is often a more reliable source of support. Diaspora support can provide financial assistance to an insurgent organization, but it cannot offer the same kinds of assistance that a state can offer. Even

so, through politically powerful organizations, diasporas can manipulate a foreign government's foreign policy and provide diplomatic support to an insurgent cause.

Another source of external support for an insurgent organization is displaced populations or refugees. Since displaced people are often the victims of a civil war or an anti-colonial war, they often share and contribute to the insurgent cause. Displaced Afghans in Pakistan, and displaced Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon provide significant numbers of manpower to Taliban, P.L.O or HAMAS. Refugee camps are ideal places for insurgent organizations to organize, train, and recruit new members.

Comparing across sources of external support after the Cold War, Byman et al. (2001) concluded:

Of the 74 insurgencies active since 1991, . . . 44 received state support that . . . was significant or critical to the survival and success of the movement (several other insurgencies received state support that was of limited consequence). Other outside supporters were also active: 21 movements received significant support from refugees, 19 received significant support from diasporas, and 25 gained backing from other outside actors. (p. 2)

In summary, states, diasporas, and refugees provide different forms of external support to an insurgent organization. "Safe havens" or "sanctuaries," in which insurgent organizations organize, arm, and train their forces and stage operations, are one of the most important forms of external support. Sanctuaries gain special importance if insurgents cannot create liberated zones or permanent bases inside the country. Sanctuaries in a foreign country also provide safe places beyond the reach of military forces of the government.

Another form of external support to an insurgent movement is financial assistance. As Byman et al. (2001) wrote, "Funds can be used to buy weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives to write propaganda, provide a social network that builds a popular base, and otherwise serve a myriad of purposes" (p. xvii). Although an insurgent organization can obtain money from internal sources, through forced taxation of the local population or illegitimate business such as drug trafficking or bank robberies, internal sources are seldom enough to address the financial needs of the organization. States and diasporas can offer significant amounts of financial assistance to the movement.

A third form of external support is political support for the insurgent cause. States can provide overt diplomatic support to an insurgent organization. The support of the Arab League for PLO, and the support of Pakistan for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan are the two important examples of political support. States can provide political support in different ways:

States may . . . provide political support, giving insurgents access to their diplomatic apparatus, pushing for recognition of the insurgent movement in international fora, encouraging aid agencies to provide assistance to the group directly, and otherwise championing the insurgent cause. In addition, political support often involves denying assistance to the government the insurgent oppose. (Byman et al. 2001, p. xviii)

Others forms of external support show decreasing levels of importance to insurgent organizations. Direct military support to an insurgency by a state might be an important contribution, but it happens very rarely. The supply of weapons is also critical but not vital; insurgents can acquire weapons from the enemy or buy them through world black-markets. Insurgents do not need hi-tech weapons or heavy weapon systems, although it certainly helps to counter the government's superiority in critical fields. Equipping of Afghan fighters combating against Soviet Union with Stinger Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) systems helped them to limit the effectiveness of Soviet helicopters. Military, ideological, and organizational training of insurgents by external sources may also help, but their effects will be limited.

III. STRATEGIES OF INSURGENCY

A. INTRODUCTION

Revolutionary movements have used different strategies to achieve their goals. The differences between strategies are mainly based on the tactics insurgents use (guerrilla warfare-terrorism), the support base of the insurgency (urban-rural, workers-peasants), or the duration of the insurgent struggle (short-protracted).

It may be proper to make a distinction between urban-based insurgencies and rural-based insurgent strategies. As a consequence, this study mainly focuses on two original rural-based insurgency models: the protracted war model developed by Mao and the foco theory developed by Che Guevara. The conspiratorial revolutionary model designed by Lenin, which grew out of years of political work and secret, underground activities rather than military struggle, is not included in this study. Terrorism, as a strategy of insurgency, is analyzed in the context of an insurgent environment in which “terror” is used as a supplementary and auxiliary weapon to other forms of revolutionary struggle.

B. MAO AND PROTRACTED WAR STRATEGY

Guerrilla tactics against militarily superior forces have been used for centuries and their main principles have long been well known to its practitioners. At the beginning of the twentieth century, T. E. Lawrence developed a theory of rebellion during his years in the Arabian Peninsula in the First World War. Lawrence (1926) noted that a rebellion must have “an unassailable base, guarded not only from attack, but from the fear of attack,” and it must have “a friendly population, of which some two in one hundred were active, and the rest quietly sympathetic to the point of not betraying the movements of the minority.” “The active rebels,” wrote Lawrence, must have “the virtues of secrecy and self-control, and the qualities of speed, endurance, and independence of arteries of supply” (p. 196). The concept of “base areas,” the importance of “popular support,” and characteristics of a guerrilla fighter were well-known long before Mao used these terms and employed them in his protracted war strategy during the Chinese Civil War. Katzenbach and Hanrahan (1964) claim:

Mao, like Clausewitz, in regular military theory, did not invent something new. His ability lies, rather, in pulling together a group of previously unrelated and unstudied techniques – shaping these into a single operational pattern. (pp. 134-5)

What distinguishes Mao from other guerrilla leaders is his extraordinary genius in combining old guerrilla tactics with a political ideology, and forming a coherent, systematic theory of insurgency. His major writings on strategy and tactics in the anti-Kuomintang and anti-Japanese Wars – *The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains* (1928), *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War* (1936), *Guerrilla Warfare* (1937), *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan* (1938), *On Protracted War* (1938), and *Problems of War and Strategy* (1938) – formed the theoretical framework of his theory. In most of his early writings, Mao (1967) warns against the rigid interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine:

China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged in the specific environment of China, and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has specific laws of its own. (p. 78)

After the catastrophic attacks of Communist armies against cities held by Nationalists in the summer of 1930, the Marxist dogma that the revolution must be based on the industrial proletariat was abandoned, and a peasant-based rural struggle was accepted. Mao (1967) understood that conditions in China were different from those in the Soviet Union and noted:

The experience of the civil war in the Soviet Union directed by Lenin and Stalin has a world-wide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, regard this experience and its theoretical summing-up by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically to our conditions. In many aspects, China's revolutionary war has characteristics distinguishing it from the civil war in the Soviet Union. (pp. 92-3)

Understanding that there can be no dogmatic, stereotyped, universal approach to war, Mao (1967) criticized those who supported the return to the example of the Soviet Union in the strategy of China's revolutionary war:

When the enemy changed his military principles to suit operations against the Red Army, there appeared in our ranks a group of people who reverted to the "old ways." They urged a return to ways suited to the general run of things, refused to go into the specific circumstances of each case, rejected the experience gained in the Red Army's history of sanguinary battles, belittled the strength of imperialism and the Kuomintang as well as that of the Kuomintang army, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. As a result, all the revolutionary bases except the Shensi-Kansu border area were lost, the Red Army was reduced from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, the membership of the Chinese Communist Party fell from 300,000 to a few tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Kuomintang areas were almost all destroyed. In short, we paid a severe penalty, which was historic in its significance. This group of people called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but actually they had not learned an iota of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. That was precisely the point these comrades of ours forgot. (p. 93)

Combining the ancient Chinese concept of *Yin -Yang* (dark and light, the principle of opposite polarities) and the Marxist dialectic method of study with his battlefield experiences, Mao formed his protracted war strategy. Mao's strategy influenced many insurgent movements during the second half of the twentieth century and presented a ready-to-use recipe for revolution in Third World countries.

1. Space, Time, and Will

A careful assessment of "the specific environment of China" and "its own specific circumstances" led Mao to important conclusions. China was a big country with a large population; but its economy was weak, it had very few industrial facilities, and most of the population was peasants and unorganized. Thus, China's huge population and large territory were its strengths, whereas its economic and political backwardness were its weaknesses. The operational problem for Mao was how to transform and exploit weakness into a source of strength to defeat his enemies.

The first method Mao turned to was "political mobilization;" that is, "raising the level of political consciousness of the people and involving them actively in the revolutionary struggle" (Taber, 2002, p. 43). It was only by arousing and organizing the masses Chinese Communists could have a chance to survive the war and achieve victory. According to Mao (1967):

A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensive and thoroughgoing political mobilization. . . . The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority of arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. . . . To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving the chariot north," and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory. (p. 228)

Mao understood that without political mobilization victory could not be achieved.

A noted expert in the field, S. B. Griffith (1961), noted:

Guerrilla leaders spend a great deal more time in organization, instruction, agitation, and propaganda work than they do fighting, for their most important job is to win over the people. "We must patiently explain," says Mao Tse-tung. "Explain," "persuade," "discuss," "convince" – these words recur with monotonous regularity in many of the early Chinese essays on guerrilla war. (p. 8)

In a resolution to the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army, Mao criticized some members of the Party for refusing to recognize the importance of political aspects of the conflict. Mao (1961) argues that "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained" (p. 43). To Mao, people "may be likened to water" and the guerrillas "to the fish who inhabit it" (p. 93). As it would be inconceivable for a fish to live without water, the guerrillas cannot survive without the people. He criticized the party members who demand the separation of the military and people, and notes that "The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese" (p. 44). Among "many other conditions indispensable to victory," Mao wrote, "political mobilization is the most fundamental" (p. 261).

Nevertheless, the importance of political mobilization and the vital relationship between the people and guerrillas must not be confused with sympathy of the population towards the guerrillas or the popularity of the insurgent organization among the people.

Persuasion, propaganda, and other positive incentives were widely used to gain the support of the population, but when these tactics failed, Communists did not avoid using force to achieve compliance:

Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. . . . Everything in Yenan has been created by having guns. (Tse-tung, 1967, pp. 274-5)

Mao believed that war is not an end in itself; to the contrary, it is a means to achieve strategic objectives and it must serve political goals. Understanding the Clausewitzian concept of war – that it is a continuation of politics by other means – Mao (1967) declared:

The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence. (p. 54)

Another operational problem for Mao was that political mobilization takes *time*. The conversion and indoctrination of recruits, the establishment of insurgent organization at the village level, and the organization of the masses along the party lines require a great deal of time. Katzenbach and Hanrahan (Osanka, 1962, chap. 10) note that “as the cornerstone of military planning Mao Tse-tung has placed a politico-revolutionary sense of time. . . . Mao has spent his life and thought on how to gain *time*” (p. 134). To gain *time*, Mao traded *space* for *time*. As Taber (2002) appropriately observes “Mao avoided battle by surrendering territory. In so doing, he traded space for time, and used the time to produce will: the psychological capacity of Chinese people to resist defeat” (p.42). “Unlimited time,” writes McCormick (1999), “required unlimited space,” and to gain that space, guerrillas would organize “in those areas of the country in which the regime was weak” (p. 25). McCormick further notes:

In pursuing such a strategy, the insurgency would give itself the best opportunity to gain the time it required to establish an institutional counterweight to the state. Revolutionary organization, in turn, would further extend the guerrillas’ ability to establish effective spatial control. (p. 25)

It is on this principle of “space against time” that Mao developed his protracted war theory. Pustay (1965) asserts:

The theoretical concepts of protracted warfare and the cellular evolution of stages of insurgency warfare both stem from this postulation [space against time]. . . . Time . . . is what insurgency feeds upon. It is through time that a technologically inferior force can so organize and indoctrinate the populace that it will become in essence the collective base of this insurgency. It is from this base that the insurgent forces will derive a growing strength that will ultimately permit them to destroy the incumbent government’s modern army. (pp. 30-31)

Mao (1967) explains the rationale for the necessity of conforming to a protracted strategy and claims:

The four principal characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled. (p. 97)

Due to China’s semi-feudal, politically unorganized society, and its industrial weakness, Mao understood that it could not win a swift, blitzkrieg style victory against its enemies. From China’s weaknesses and strengths, Mao operationalized his protracted war strategy in the anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang wars.

2. Constructing the Operational Art of Protracted War Strategy

Protracted war strategy is not an invention of Mao. In the American Revolution, George Washington intentionally avoided a decisive war with the British, kept the American army intact, and waited for the appropriate time to attack. Russians managed to expel the armies of both Napoleon and Hitler by exchanging space for time, eroding the strength and will of the enemy, and expanding and preparing their forces. In the first two years of the Turkish Liberation War (1919-1922), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk avoided an open confrontation with the Greeks and waged a guerrilla struggle through locally organized guerrillas (*Kuvayi Milliye*). Mustafa Kemal gradually withdrew to the steppes

of Anatolia, traded *space* for *time*, and used that *time* to produce *will*, organize the nation, and form an army. Mustafa Kemal agreed to fight a conventional war only after he formed a national army from scratch and the Greek army consumed its energy and overstretched its logistical lines in the Anatolian hinterland.

China in the 1930s shared three commonalities with these countries: it was militarily weak against the enemy, it had a vast area that exceeded the capacity of the occupying power to control, and it had the potential to defeat the enemy in the long term. Thus, the operational problem for Mao (1967) was “to strive to the utmost to preserve one’s own strength and destroy that of the enemy” (p. 155). From that basic principle, Mao generated six principles that guided military operations:

(1) the use of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations; (2) coordination with regular warfare, (3) establishment of base areas, (4) the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, (6) and correct relationship of command. (pp. 156)

These six principles constitute the foundations for the strategic plan for the guerrilla war. Mao (1967) defined initiative as “freedom of action for an army,” and urged that any army losing the initiative “faces the danger of defeat or extermination” (p. 161). Keeping initiative is more vital in guerrilla warfare, as guerrilla units act in small groups and fight against superior forces. Flexibility, which is the “concrete expression of the initiative” is the precondition for survival, because guerrilla leaders must adapt to the new situations, deploy, concentrate, and disperse their forces “like a fishermen casting his net, which he should be able to spread wide - as well as draw in tight” (p. 162).

The second principle guiding the military operations (coordination of guerrilla activities with the activities of the regular army) takes place in three levels: “coordination in strategy, in campaigns and in battles” (Mao, 1967, p. 165). Close coordination at the strategic planning and even at the campaign level is necessary for the success of the guerrilla operations, whereas coordination in the battles is restricted to guerrilla units in the vicinity of the battlefield.

Establishment of base areas is so important that without these bases guerrilla warfare is unsustainable. Mao (1967) describes base areas as “the strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing their strategic tasks and achieving the object of preserving and expanding themselves and destroying and driving out the enemy.” According to Mao:

It is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines that it is fought without a rear, for the guerrilla forces are severed from the country's general rear. But guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without base areas. The base areas, indeed, are its rear. (pp. 167-8)

Mao (1967) also distinguishes base areas which are under guerrilla control from “guerrilla zones,” areas that are under government control and that guerrillas could not occupy, but have relative operational capabilities. Ideally, “guerrilla zones” will be transformed into “base areas,” “base areas” will expand and cover the whole countryside, and then the whole country will be covered (pp. 170-171). This will amount to a protracted “encirclement,” writes McCormick (1999), “in which the urban regions of the country are encircled and eventually detached from the interior” (p. 26).

The strategic defensive and the strategic offensive principle characterize the strategic situation, not the situation of guerrilla units, because guerrilla units will always be on the offensive and maintain the initiative. In the strategic defensive phase, guerrilla units destroy the security forces of the Authority one by one with surprise attacks and ambushes. In the strategic offensive, the target is not the main enemy units who are entrenched in defensive positions, but the small, isolated units, communication lines, and logistical lines of the enemy.

The fifth principle, development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, is an essential step on the way to victory, since guerrilla war should only play a supplementary and auxiliary role. After guerrillas change the balance of power to their favor, they “gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army” (Mao, 1961, p. 94). Summarizing the relationship between guerrilla efforts and regular forces in the anti-Japanese war, Mao (1961) claimed:

Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the

enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who alone are capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favorable decision. (p. 56)

The last principle of the guerrilla war strategy, relationship of command, is far different from the command relationship in conventional units. In the regular army, the command relationship between units is strictly defined with a centralized structure. In contrast, guerrilla units usually operate in small units and in extensive areas that make communication and centralized structure difficult. The solution, according to Mao (1967), should be “centralized strategic command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles” (p. 184).

3. The Stages of Revolutionary Struggle

To achieve victory, Mao (1967) describes three stages of an insurgency that a protracted war will pass through. Stage one: Communists are on the “strategic defensive” and the enemy is on the “strategic offensive.” Stage two: “strategic stalemate” is the period of achieving parity with the enemy and preparing for the counter-offensive. The final phase of the protracted war will be a period of “strategic offensive.” Nevertheless, there are no rigid lines between stages; many setbacks will occur during the war, and stages will overlap (pp. 210-211).

The first stage, the strategic defensive, is the phase of preparation and strategic retreat where needed. In this phase, insurgents avoid decisive battles and emphasis is given to organization, establishment of base areas, and political mobilization. The primary objective is to preserve the organization and strength of the insurgent forces while trying to destroy the strength of the Authority. The establishment of base areas is an important component of this stage, in which guerrilla bases gradually surround guerrilla zones and transform them into new base areas.

The second stage of the war, strategic stalemate, will be reached when the insurgents achieve parity with the Authority. This stage is characterized by extensive use of guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. The base areas will expand and new areas will be taken under control of the Communist regime. “This second stage,”

writes Mao (1967), “will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most trying period but also the pivotal one” (p. 213).

The third stage, the strategic offensive, will be the last stage of the protracted war. The primary form of war will be mobile warfare, but it will be supplemented by positional warfare where necessary. Guerrilla warfare will continue to provide strategic support, but it will no longer be the primary form of warfare. Most guerrilla units will gradually transform into conventional units. “The strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase,” argues Mao, “but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there” (p. 217).

Mao (1967) summarizes the three stages of the protracted war in his anti-Japanese war strategy:

China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan moving from the offensive to the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat - such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend. (p. 217)

Katzenbach and Hanrahan (1962) argue that “his [Mao’s] theory is, in essence, a theory of substitution: substitution of propaganda for guns, subversion for air power, men for machines, space for mechanization, [and] political for industrial mobilization (p. 136). Guerrilla warfare or protracted warfare should not be considered as a strategy of choice for the Communists, but rather the special circumstances of China imposed these tactics.

C. FOCO THEORY

The Cuban model of insurgency was based on Fidel Castro’s successful struggle in Cuba. The lessons of the Cuban Revolution were codified into a theory of guerrilla warfare in the writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara (*Guerrilla Warfare*, 1961) and Regis Debray (*Revolution in the Revolution?* 1967). At the very beginning of his book, Che Guevara (1961) wrote that “the Cuban Revolution made three fundamental contributions to the mechanics of revolutionary movements in America” (p. 7):

1. The forces of the people can win a war against an army.
2. It is not necessary to wait for the fulfillment of all conditions for a revolution because the focus of insurrection can create them.
3. The area for the armed struggle in underdeveloped America is the rural regions.

Although Guevara (1961) initially claims that guerrillas can create the conditions of a revolution by themselves, he later admits the constraints set by given conditions and posited that “there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate” (p. 8). Guevara even asserts that “Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote . . . and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted” (p. 8).

Despite the fact that Guevara’s ideas on guerrilla warfare show significant similarities with the Chinese version of the people’s war, there are, in fact, fundamental differences. The Cuban Revolution followed a different path than the Chinese Revolution, and it has its own characteristics. As Regis Debray (1967) describes:

One may well consider it a stroke of good luck that Fidel had not read the military writings of Mao Tse-tung before disembarking on the coast of Oriente: he could thus invent, on the spot and out of his own experience, principles of a military doctrine in conformity with the terrain. (p. 20)

1. Primacy of Military Forces over the Political Party

One major difference of *foco* theory from Mao’s protracted war theory is that it gives primacy to military action and reduces political action to a secondary role. Guevara (1961) argues that “The guerrilla band [*foco*] is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people” (p. 10). *Foco* is not the armed fist of the revolution which is controlled by the political party as in traditional Communist doctrine, but is regarded as the nucleus of the insurrection in the Cuban model of insurgency. As Debray (1967) puts it “*The people’s army will be the nucleus of the party, not vice versa*. The guerrilla force is the political vanguard in *nucle*, and from its development a real party can arise” (p. 116).

Debray believes that the subordination of the guerrilla band to the political leadership “brings in its wake a series of fatal military errors” (p. 68). Since the political leadership would be in the cities, notes Debray, that would lead “to logistical and military dependence of the mountain forces on the city. This dependence often leads to abandonment of the guerrilla force by the city leadership” (p. 70). Instead, Debray suggests:

Under certain conditions, the political and the military are not separate, but form one organic whole, consisting of the people’s army. The vanguard party can exist in the form of the guerrilla foco itself. The guerrilla force is the party in embryo. (p. 106)

Ideally, the original guerrilla band should gradually grow “until it has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants, it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns” (p. 17). Gradually, Guevara claims the *foco* would grow and spread to other regions “similar to that of the beehive when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the swarm. The mother hive with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous places” (p. 17). And as each *foco* reaches a respectable size, new swarms will penetrate enemy territory and the process will repeat itself in the new areas.

2. The Rural Character of the Struggle and Importance of Popular Support

Despite the differences in the role of the political party (vis-à-vis the guerrilla band), the Cuban model still shares important aspects with the Chinese protracted war model. As with the Mao’s model, the *foco* theory assumes that the area for the armed struggle in underdeveloped America is the rural regions. The cities were seen as dangerous places for the guerrilla band. The main support of the movement would be in the countryside. Guevara (1961) criticizes “those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is the city centers, entirely forgetting the immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America” (p. 8).

Guevara (1967) asserts that to survive “the guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area” (p. 10). According to Guevara, “The only thing (a bandit gang) is missing (from a guerrilla band) is support of the people,” and, inevitably, “these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public force” (p. 10). Bard O’Neill (1990) criticizes

the Cuban model for making “no systematic, sustained effort to acquire it [popular support] through extensive organizing efforts in the rural areas” (p. 41). Instead of a careful, intensive organizational effort to gain the support of the population, “Guevara’s theory,” notes McCormick (1999), “relied heavily on the spontaneity of the insurgent’s natural allies to provide the guerrilla foco with the critical mass it required to win” (p. 30).

3. Stages of the Revolutionary Struggle

In operational terms, Guevara (1967), like Mao, asserts that “the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed” (p. 15). After surviving the initial phase, it will be much easier for the guerrilla band to be on the offensive. Debray (1967) offered a three-stage strategy for a revolutionary struggle:

First, the stage of establishment; second, the stage of development, marked by the enemy offensive carried out by all available means (operational and tactical encirclements, airborne troops, bombardments, etc.); finally, the stage of revolutionary phase, at once political and military. (p. 32)

Needless to say, the three-stage revolutionary strategy that Debray offers is quite reminiscent of Mao’s protracted war strategy. As in the Chinese example, the final blow to the enemy will not be a guerrilla blow. Like Mao, Guevara (1961) claims:

Guerrilla warfare is a phase that does not in itself (create) opportunities to arrive at complete victory. It is one of the initial phases of warfare and will develop continuously until the guerrilla army . . . acquires the characteristics of a regular army. At that moment, it will be ready to deal final blows to the enemy and to achieve victory. Triumph will always be the product of a regular army, even though its origins are in a guerrilla army. (p. 13)

McCormick (1999) compares the Cuban model of insurgency with the protracted war model developed by Mao and concludes that Maoist insurgency “is a problem of organization,” in which insurgents build a “grassroots, village-based alternative to the state.” To the contrary, in the Cuban model, the guerrillas’ primary goal is psychological; that is, to “capture the popular imagination in the expectation of generating a popular uprising against the state” (p. 33).

After the failure and death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, and the failure of other insurgent groups that followed the Cuban example in Latin America, focoism lost its initial appeal. According to Shy and Collier (Paret, 1986, chap. 27):

Experience so far indicates that focoism, however plausible, is not effective; results have been . . . disastrous. Mao and Giap might have told Guevara and Debray that foco violence, rather than catalyzing revolution, would instead expose the revolutionary movement at its weakest moment to a crushing counterattack, as happened in Bolivia. . . . Perhaps the most serious flaw of focoism is that it ignores the reciprocal nature of the orthodox first phase of revolutionary war: the long, hard work of political preparation not only organizes the peasantry and proletariat, but it also teaches the revolutionary activists . . . about the people, the villages, the attitudes and the grievances, even the physical terrain, on which revolutionary war must be based. (pp. 850-851)

There are many criticisms of the foco theory that it failed to grasp the real lessons of the Cuban revolution and ignored the thorough organizational work that is necessary to prepare the masses for the revolutionary struggle. There is a romantic but irrational or baseless belief among the proponents of the foco theory - that a heroic image of the guerrilla fighter, like a modern Robin Hood, would inspire the peasants to join the revolutionary struggle. Failing to bring revolution to Latin American countries, in the end, *foco* theory caused the Latin American revolutionaries to search for a new theory that finally led to a wave of urban terrorism in these countries.

D. TERROR AS A STRATEGY OF INSURGENCY

1. On the Nature of Revolutionary Terror

It seems suitable to begin a discussion of terror as a strategy of insurgency by making a distinction between rural revolutionary strategies, in which terror plays a secondary and supplementary role, and urban revolutionary strategies that support the primacy of terror in the overall revolutionary struggle. The type of revolutionary terrorism that is used extensively by urban terrorist organizations such as IRA, ETA, or the Red Brigades, is not the subject of this study. Rather, this study focuses on the type of revolutionary terror that is used as a supplementary and secondary strategy to the main strategy, as used by Chinese, Vietnamese, and Algerian revolutionaries.

A definition of terror will help us to analyze the nature and objectives of terror in the context of an insurgent environment. Tomas Perry Thornton (1964) defines terror as

“a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence” (p. 73). The sub-components of this definition help us to distinguish what comprises terror and what does not in insurgent environments.

Terror is a symbolic act. The real targets of terror are often different from the target that is hit or destroyed by a bomb. A terrorist rarely knows the victims of his acts; the victims of a terrorist act are only unfortunate individuals who have no responsibility or blame in the struggle between the terrorists and the government. Instead, by striking the symbols of authority and conducting terrorist attacks whenever and wherever it wants, a terrorist organization seeks to demonstrate its own strength and the weakness of the government to provide protection to the population.

Terror is designed to influence political behavior. The terrorist is motivated by a political goal. If a man kills an individual for personal gain, loss, or satisfaction, that is ordinary crime. However, if a man kills an individual or detonates a bomb to advocate or propagate the rights or beliefs of a religious or ethnic minority, or any other social class, the act is motivated by a political goal, and we can call it terrorism. Instead of directly influencing the political decisions of an incumbent regime, insurgents aim to manipulate the political preferences of the civilian population. Thornton (1964) writes that “Terrorism may gain political ends in two ways – either by mobilizing forces and reserves sympathetic to the cause of the insurgents or by immobilizing forces and reserves that would normally be available to the incumbents” (p. 73). As in the subversion of government infrastructure and establishment of parallel hierarchies, the insurgents build their own bases of support (construction) and at the same time erode the base of support for the government (destruction) by using terror.

Terrorists use extranormal means. Obviously, in an insurgent environment, the “normal” means of constitutional, political process are already consumed. The means that the terrorists use are mostly beyond the population’s conception of “normal” and even have shocking effects that cause a disruption in the daily lives of the silent majority. Terrorists aim to disrupt the inertial status of peace or stability and seek to shake the very foundations of the society.

Terror entails the use or threat of violence. Members of a nonviolent movement cannot be labeled as terrorists. The factor that distinguishes terror from the use of “pure” force is the “threat” of violence. In fact, the actual implementation of violence and the threat to use force are interrelated. Mostly, insurgent groups issue symbolic warnings and threats to an individual or a group of people (such as collaborators with the regime, village leaders, or prominent political leaders who belong to the same ethnic or religious group as the insurgents) and try to morally justify their executions in order to demonstrate that the insurgents actually tried and failed to persuade these people and, thereby, consumed other options. Another aspect of the use of violence is its message to other people. By using terror whenever and wherever it wants, an insurgent organization demonstrates that it has the power to fulfill its will, and the people who fail to collaborate with its demands will face the same fate.

Brian Crozier (1960), in his widely acclaimed book, *The Rebels*, notes that “Terror is a weapon of the weak” (p.159). Lacking the necessary resources to face government forces openly, insurgents use different strategies to compensate for their weaknesses. In that regard, we must see terrorism as a weapon of insurgency among other means of struggle in the insurgents’ arsenal. Crenshaw (1972) appropriately noted that “The revolutionary movement’s decision to use terrorism should be considered as a choice among violent means, not between violence and nonviolence” (p. 386). Violence is not the only instrument available to an insurgent organization; but, it is obviously an important one. Among the violent strategies of revolutionary struggle (guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and terrorism), insurgents use the most appropriate and effective strategy depending on the phase of revolutionary struggle. Ariel Merari (1993) claims that “the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle” (p. 213). That does not necessarily mean that insurgents apply terrorism as a last resort, but they choose the most appropriate strategy depending on the phase of struggle, the power of the incumbent regime, the sympathy and support of the population towards the insurgent movement, and the quality (manpower, money, material) of the resources that an insurgent organization controls.

The rhetoric that the insurgents strive for popular support and therefore they are unlikely to use violence against the civilian population is mere illusion. It is true that insurgents seek to gain popular support, but when persuasion or other positive sanctions of gaining the support of the population fail, the negative sanctions of coercion and terror are applied. The concept of political power growing out of the barrel of a gun has been known in China for centuries. Mao (1927) understood the importance of coercion in gaining unconditional support of the population and noted that “it is necessary to create terror for awhile in every rural area, otherwise it would be impossible to suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry” (§ 6). The supporters of the *foco* theory denounced the use of terror against the population and claimed that “terrorism is of negative value, that it by no means produces the desired effects, that it can turn a people against a revolutionary movement, and that it can bring loss of lives out of proportion to what it produces” (Guevara, 1961, p. 99). Nevertheless, Regis Debray (1967) admits the value of terror as a supplementary strategy to rural guerrilla warfare and claims:

City terrorism cannot assume any decisive role, and it entails certain dangers of a political order. But if it is subordinate to the fundamental struggle, the struggle in the countryside, it has, from the military point of view, a strategic value; it immobilizes thousands of enemy soldiers, it ties up most of the repressive mechanism in unrewarding tasks of protection: factories, bridges, electric generators, public buildings, highways, oil pipelines – these can keep busy as much as three quarters of the army. (p. 75)

Nonetheless, both Che Guevara and Regis Debray failed to grasp the real value of terror as a strategic weapon of insurgency. Blinded by the myth of *foco*, and misunderstanding and misinterpreting the lessons of the Cuban revolution, Che and Debray focused only on the military value of terror, and ignored the real objectives of terror in immobilizing the support base of the Authority and at the same time mobilizing the support base of the insurgents.

The objectives of terror are manifold. Brian Crozier (1960) argues that “A common purpose (of terrorism) is to make life unendurable for the enemy” (p. 160). If we accept Crozier’s argument, the logic in the use of terror would make occupation for the colonial power so costly that, in the end, the colonial power will realize the futility of

occupation and decide to withdraw. Although Crozier's argument is well-suited for a liberation movement against a colonial power, the strategy of making life unendurable for the enemy may fail in an internal war situation.

One objective of terror may be "*morale-building*" within the terrorist movement itself, as well as in that element of the population that is already sympathetic to the insurgents. Another objective of terror is "*advertising the movement*" (Thornton 1964, p. 82). Ariel Merari (1993) notes:

The most basic notion of terrorism as a strategy is the idea of propaganda by the deed, which viewed this mode of struggle as a tool for spreading the word of the insurrection, expanding its popular base, and thus serving as a lever for and prelude to a more advanced form of insurrection. (p. 238)

A third objective, albeit less important one, is the "elimination of opposing forces, either physically or by neutralizing their effectiveness" (p. 86). Although all of these objectives are important, these objectives must be seen as side-objectives of the more strategic objectives of an insurgent movement.

The most important objective of an insurgent organization, regardless of the mode of struggle (be it terror, guerrilla warfare, or mobile warfare), is breaking the ties between the population and the government. Without the disruption of government control over the population, insurgents cannot build their own structure. Thornton (1964) properly posits:

Among the various tasks of an insurgent group, the one that will interest us primarily is its need to disrupt the inertial relationship between incumbents and mass. In order to do this, the insurgents must break the tie that binds the mass to the incumbents within the society, and they must remove the structural supports that give the society its strength. (p. 74)

It is a well-known fact that insurgent organizations begin to develop in the remote places of a country, where little or no governmental authority exists. Filling the vacuum of power after destroying the remnants of governmental authority, insurgents start establishing parallel hierarchies and shadow governments. Analyzing how the Viet Cong disrupted government control, Tinker (1969) writes:

When, through the simple process of attrition, the machinery of government in one area comes to a standstill, the Viet Cong reestablishes social order by setting up a “shadow government” with its own “officialdom” to collect taxes, operate schools, and implement population control measures. (p. 203)

Another important objective of terror is the provocation of government countermeasures by the insurgents. Thornton (1964) notes that “In combating an elusive terrorist, the incumbents will be forced to take measures that affect not only the terrorist, but also his environment, the society as a whole” (pp. 86-7). By provoking the government into repression, insurgents can claim that they are fighting against repression and enhance their support both in the local population and in the international domain. According to Thornton:

They (insurgents) attempt to provoke the incumbents into repressive measures, in order to claim that the incumbents have made the constitutional machinery unavailable. It therefore seems probable that, the longer the incumbents can delay opposing terror with extranormal means of repression, the more advantage they will have in belying insurgent propaganda. (p. 76)

The repressive measures that an incumbent regime implements will create an atmosphere of insecurity and instability as a bonus effect to the provocative efforts of the insurgents. If repression achieves its objective to destroy the terrorist organization, then the population will see the repressive measures as necessary and justifiable. However, if repression fails to destroy the organization and its leadership cadre or prevent terrorist activities, then repression will cause more problems than it promised to solve. Crenshaw (1972) argues that “If . . . the revolutionary movement survives the regime’s reaction, repression is likely to further revolutionary goals by alienating the civilian population by the government” (p. 391). Repression is a double-edged sword; even though it helps to extinguish a terrorist organization by greatly increasing the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies, it also may damage the trust the population has in the incumbent regime and thereby contributes to the insurgent goal of creating an atmosphere of insecurity and instability.

2. Why Do Insurgents Use Terror?

The aforementioned objectives of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency explain the expectations and goals of the insurgents for using terror. Nevertheless, the objectives of terrorism do not explain the reasons that compel the insurgents to use terror. In other words, why do insurgents turn to terror over other means? After all, insurgents accuse an incumbent regime of being morally corrupted, repressive, and ruthless against its own population, and claim to fight for superior ideals. For an insurgent organization that claims to bring justice and promises a better world, the use of terror seems to contradict to the lofty rhetoric of popular support and promise of a better world. Nonetheless, insurgents do use terror for a number of reasons.

Often insurgents have no other way to achieve their revolutionary goals and utilize terror only as a “last resort” strategy. The geography of the country may not be suitable for a rural guerrilla-type revolutionary struggle. Another explanation for the “last resort” argument may be that insurgents lack the necessary resources to wage a higher form of struggle.

The cost of terrorism is much lower than the expense of forming, arming, and supplying guerrilla bands. Insurgent material weakness may thus make terrorism the only alternative. A terrorist organization whether urban or rural requires few militants who need little training, no uniforms, no special equipments, and who do not even require individual weapons. . . . The basic requirements for terrorism are secrecy, discipline, and thorough organization, none of which requires heavy financial investment. (Crenshaw, 1972, p. 387)

A third explanation for the “last resort” argument is that the incumbent regime may be too powerful and that insurgents cannot dare to confront the Authority even in the form of a guerrilla war. Insurgents may have all the necessary resources for a full-scale guerrilla war, but if the government forces are too powerful and do not leave any open space in which the guerrillas can operate, insurgents will not survive for long. Moreover, if the government forces manage to destroy the guerrilla bands and gain control of the rural areas, insurgents then abandon guerrilla warfare and carry out terroristic acts in urban areas. In this case, when the insurgents abandon a higher form of struggle and return to a lower form of struggle, this can be interpreted as a sign of insurgent weakness and the success of government military measures. Nevertheless, the physical weakness of

an insurgent movement must not be confused with political weakness. A politically strong but militarily weak movement will probably repeat itself in the future in other forms or under different guises even if its armed forces are completely destroyed. That is why a government should avoid focusing only on the military side of an insurgent problem and should not ignore the political, social, and economic aspects of an insurgency.

Another reason that insurgents use terror is that it is an efficient form of struggle. Crenshaw (1972) noted that “The reason for the frequency of the revolutionary terrorism is that it is an effective strategy; its benefits outweigh its costs (p. 386). However, we must make a distinction between efficiency and effectiveness. When we talk about efficiency, we mean the ratio of benefits to costs or outputs to inputs. Accordingly, there are two ways to measure the efficiency of a strategy. First, we can look into the inputs or costs of the strategy to accomplish certain sets of tasks. If terror can create the desired results with lower costs and less input compared with another strategy, then we can claim that this is an efficient strategy. We already mentioned and explained above that terror is a cost-effective strategy.

The second way to consider terror’s efficiency is to measure the benefits or outputs created with a given amount of inputs or costs. Terrorism’s returns are “far out of proportion to the amount of time, energy, and materials the insurgents invest on it, enabling terrorists to project an image many times larger than their actual strength” (Thornton 1964, p.88). Terrorism is not efficient just because of its low cost, but usually it can guarantee disproportional levels of success in relation to the amount of investment. Through terrorism, insurgent organizations gain publicity, increase their members’ morale by acting and, most importantly, provoke an Authority to overreact that can alienate the population from the Authority. A small group, which lacks necessary financial resources and has a very small number of supporters, can use terrorism in the initial phases of a revolutionary struggle to gain support of the population, to attract attention and sympathy to its cause, and to compensate its weakness vis-à-vis the incumbent regime.

The third reason that induces insurgents to use terror is its effectiveness. We defined efficiency as a ratio of outputs to inputs; but efficiency and effectiveness are not the same things. An effective strategy is one that helps an organization to achieve its objectives within certain constraints. We can assess the effectiveness of a strategy by measuring the percentage of realized targets to the initial objectives. To measure the effectiveness of terror for an insurgent organization, we must know the objectives and expectations of the organization by using terror. Use of terror obviously has some side effects for the insurgent cause; but, insurgents may be willing to lose a tactical battle for a strategic gain. Acts of terror may generate hostility or loss of sympathy towards the insurgent cause both in the international and in the domestic arenas, but insurgents may ignore these secondary effects to attain more immediate needs. The effectiveness of terror must be measured in terms of objectives. If terror helps an organization to achieve its objectives, then it is effective.

The ultimate objective of an insurgent movement is the transfer of political power from the incumbent regime to the insurgents. Can insurgents achieve this objective by terror? The history of insurgency demonstrates that terror by itself is not sufficient to achieve insurgent goals. Terror can disrupt, disorient, destroy, provoke but cannot build. Terror is not a constructive strategy; its main functions are destructive. Thornton (1964) claims:

Terror by itself cannot be the final determinant of the outcome of an internal war. It can only be regarded as a means to an end, specifically, in our context, the end of political control. (p. 88)

Nevertheless, terror can be a useful strategy for the insurgent organization when it is used as a supplementary strategy to other modes of struggle. Terrorism is more effective when it is used as a part of a wider strategy. Terrorism by itself cannot force any government to concede to terrorists' demands, but when coupled with guerrilla war in rural areas, or used in tandem with regular armies of the insurgent movement, it would probably be more effective. As Brian Crozier (1960) rightly asserts, "Terrorism is generally a useful auxiliary weapon rather than a decisive one" (p. 160).

We can argue that terrorism is not effective, even counterproductive, in internal war situations, where the victims and insurgents are co-ethnics or co-religionist. On the

other hand, terrorism tends to have lasting effects and is more intensively used in situations where the two sides are ethnically and religiously diverse from each other. The cases of Israel-Palestine and Russia-Chechnya are two such. Additionally, we can say that terrorism is more effective against colonial powers, whereas it is counterproductive against a non-colonial power. For a colonial power, withdrawal is always an option; it is only a matter of costs and benefits. If terrorists or insurgents are successful in imposing a sufficient level of cost on the colonial power, then victory will be inevitable. Terrorist acts generally create diffusion within domestic politics of the colonial power. In the cases of Vietnam and Algeria, insurgents won the war in the political arena. However, if insurgents are fighting for separation from a state or for overthrowing the incumbent regime and imposing their authority, then withdrawal is not an option for the government. In those cases, terrorist methods are likely to unify public opinion against them instead of creating fissures.

3. The Place of Terror in the Insurgent Strategy

The most definitive model to place terrorism in the context of revolutionary war is the one that Brian Crozier presents. Crozier displays terrorism as the first stage of a three-stage revolutionary war. He (1960) expresses that “Insurrection tends to follow a sequence of three phases: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and full-scale war” (p. 127). In Crozier’s model, an insurgent organization starts the insurrection with a shocking wave of terrorist acts, then moves to the guerrilla war phase, and finally achieves the conventional war phase. Nevertheless, Crozier understood the inherent weaknesses in terror as a strategy of insurgency and noted:

Terrorism is the natural weapon of men with small resources fighting against superior strength. . . . Beyond a certain point, the horror of terrorist deeds is likely to work against those who order or perform them. (p. 127).

Crozier recognizes terrorism as a temporary method in the initial phase of an insurrection. Although it can still be used in the later phases, Crozier argues that “the pattern of rebellions that have been allowed to run their courses suggests that when the opportunity comes, the rebels will drop terrorism in favor of guerrilla activities, or at least relegate it to a second place” (p. 128). We must emphasize that there are no clear-cut dividing lines between the phases; different tactics may be in place at different locations.

For example, in Algeria, the F.L.N. continued to use terrorist tactics in urban areas, while waging guerrilla warfare in rural areas. However, once an insurgent organization gains the power to wage guerrilla war, the importance and intensity of terrorist tactics typically declines.

Another model of revolutionary war that attributes a special place to terror is developed by Thomas Perry Thornton. Thornton's revolutionary war model consists of five phases: preparatory phase, initial violence phase, expansion phase, victorious phase, and consolidation phase (Thornton, 1964, p. 92). Each phase in the model represents a characteristic mode of struggle. The preparatory phase is characterized by the nucleation and preparation of the insurgent movement and training of the cadres. In that phase, insurgents are mainly underground and remain unnoticed. The second, initial violence, phase is characterized by the extensive use of terror. The insurgents launch general strikes, demonstrations, and mass riots in order to garner public attention and support for the movement. If insurgents fail to get the support and the attention of the population, they may conduct terrorist acts. Thornton (1964) notes that the initial violence phase "is the classic one for the employment of agitational terror in all its functions – provocation, disorientation, elimination of rivals, and propaganda" (p. 93). Insurgents also start employing enforcement terror in the areas where they have established their own control. In the third and fourth phases, insurgents first move into guerrilla and then conventional warfare. Insurgents continue to use intermediate levels of both agitational and enforcement terror. Nevertheless, terror no longer plays the prominent role it did in the initial violence phase. Since insurgents now move from inferiority to a balance of power with the incumbent regime, and since their territorial bases are expanding, insurgents must assume the characteristics of a regular government in the areas under their control. Insurgents may continue to use agitational terror in the areas under the control of Authority, but the level of agitational terror in the areas controlled by them must decline to a minimum. The final, consolidation, phase is characterized by the establishment of insurgent authority. In that phase, there will be no agitational terror, but insurgents continue to use enforcement terror to both annihilate counterrevolutionaries and cleanse collaborators of the ex-regime.

To conclude, terror has an important role to play in revolutionary war, but its importance is restricted mainly to the initial phases of an insurgency. As the insurgent movement grows, terror takes a backseat to other modes of struggle and is used in a secondary and supplementary role. Crozier (1960) asserts that “Taken as a whole . . . terrorism . . . is generally a useful auxiliary weapon rather than a decisive one” (p. 160). Terror, by itself, cannot be the determinant form of struggle to achieve the objectives of a revolutionary movement.

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IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

A. INTRODUCTION

Having established a firm understanding of the nature of insurgency, and having explained various insurgency strategies crafted by theorists of revolutionary warfare, we shall now explore the major theories in counterinsurgency warfare. There are two approaches: cost-benefit and hearts-and-minds. Their greatest difference is that the cost-benefit model views insurgency mainly as a military problem that is generated by an insurgent organization that does not address the grievances of the people. In contrast, the hearts-and-minds model considers insurgency as to take advantage of political-social-economic problems.

Other differences relate the role of popular support, endogenous and exogenous factors, and the role of the insurgent organization in the genesis of the rebellion. Although the proponents of both models agree on the requirement of both coercive and persuasive methods, the priority of and emphasis on these tactics varies to a great extent. The cost-benefit model gives priority to security and military measures; the hearts-and-minds model stresses a more balanced approach between development and security.

Despite the apparent differences, the types of tactics and government countermeasures that are offered by the advocates of these two strategies share many commonalities. Both models suggest the use of population control methods such as resettlement programs, food control, and establishment of an effective administrative system. The major difference between the two models in terms of population control is whether the population is to be courted or coerced. As Leites and Wolf (1970) admit, “the differences are of degree rather than kind” (p. 37).

B. COST-BENEFIT MODEL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

1. Outline of the Model

a. Challenging the “Myths” of the Popular Model

The cost-benefit approach to counterinsurgency is best articulated by the work of two RAND analysts, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf. Wolf’s works on counterinsurgency warfare, “*Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities*” (1965), “*United States Policy and the Third World*” (1967), and “*Rebellion and*

Authority: an Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts” (co-authored by Nathan Leites, 1970) formed the theoretical foundations of the model. Wolf and Leites begin by criticizing the Hearts-and-Minds model because of its excessive emphasis on popular support and its ignorance of the role of external support and coercion in the genesis of a rebellion. According to Leites and Wolf (1970), the Hearts-and-Minds model can be put in the form of three propositions:

- (1) R [Rebellion] requires popular support to get started and gain momentum, and guerrilla forces require popular support to conduct successful military operations.
- (2) R derives its strength from poverty and inequality of income and wealth.
- (3) In the growth of R, and in its prospects for success, factors and influences that are fundamentally internal (endogeny) predominate over factors and influences that are external (exogeny). (pp. 8-21)

Wolf (1965) contends that the propositions that feed the myths surrounding insurgency and counterinsurgency are “stronger on symbolism and sentiment than on realism” and involve “significant inaccuracies” (p. 4). The cost-benefit model proposes that the amount of popular support that an insurgent movement needs to grow varies with its stage, scale, and activity, and it only needs the support of a small proportion of the population. Wolf asserts:

From an operational point of view, what an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular support, in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance, but rather a supply of certain inputs . . . at reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of coercion as well as money. (p. 5)

Unlike the Hearts-and-Minds model, which considers popular support an essential variable in the eventual outcome of an insurgency, cost-benefit proponents argue that popular support, in the sense of preferences, attitudes, and sympathies, is not a decisive factor. Leites and Wolf (1970) claim that “an adroit R [Rebellion] may manipulate its instrument panel in such a way that its popular support – in the sense of behavior benefiting it – rises while sympathy for its cause is falling” and an “A [Authority] may block and defeat a much-loved R” (pp. 14-5). Borrowing from

economics, Leites and Wolf claim that popular support, in the sense of behavior, is a function of neither the sympathies of the population towards a particular insurgent movement nor the appeal of the insurgent cause (nationalism, religion, or ideology), but rather is a function of some cost and benefit calculations:

Consumer behavior will typically depend on the relative prices charged rather than on pure preferences, and emergent monopolists have been known to eliminate rivals by more nefarious means than price competition. In the case of rebellions, the emergent monopolist may assist preferences through damage-limiting (penalty) or profit-maximizing (price) influences, or by collaboration with A to eliminate rivals. (p. 14)

Leites and Wolf challenge the notion that poverty and inequality breed rebellion, and dismiss a whole literature of relative deprivation and frustration-instigated behavior. They (1970) claim that “the success or failure of insurgency has not borne a simple relationship to the degree of poverty” (p. 19). Leites and Wolf argue that the effect of economic improvement programs on winning the support of the population for the government is at best uncertain. If rapid social change, economic development, and modernization increase the likelihood of violent political change (as argued by Tocqueville, Feierabend, and Brinton), then more economic development projects are likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the conditions favorable for the insurgents.

The last proposition that the proponents of the cost-benefit model challenge is the primacy of domestic factors over external factors in the Hearts-and-Minds model. Although Leites and Wolf admit the primary role of endogenous factors, they believe that the Hearts-and-Minds model minimizes the role of exogenous factors. Advocates of the cost-benefit model view the relationship between external and internal factors in terms of tradeoffs. The inputs that an insurgent organization needs can be obtained from both internal and external sources. Leites and Wolf (1970) assert that, although not sufficient alone, “curtailing exogeny is necessary . . . for successful counter-rebellion” (p. 40).

b. Demand and Supply Factors

Leites and Wolf build their model on the grounds of their criticisms of the “erroneous” propositions of their version of the Hearts-and-Minds model. To them, the Hearts-and-Minds model focuses on the demand-pull aspects of a rebellion, in which the

environmental factors cause a rebellion to emerge and grow, whereas the cost-benefit model is a cost-push strategy, in which the insurgent organization is seen as the supplier or the leading force of the rebellion.

Leites and Wolf (1970) offer two reasons for placing more emphasis on the supply side of the problem: first, market behavior is determined by the interaction between demand and supply conditions. Second, “supply conditions are probably more elastic (responsive) . . . to programs and policies than are demand conditions” (pp. 29). Actually, the decision to focus on supply conditions is a practical one, since it would be much more difficult to change underlying environmental conditions (development and modernization of a country) than the shorter route of dealing with the insurgent organization.

c. *The Rational Man*

Fundamental to the cost-benefit model is the assumption that “the population as individuals or groups, behaves ‘rationally’; that it calculates costs and benefits to the extent that they can be related to different courses of action, and makes choices accordingly” (p. 29). In other words, the proponents of the cost-benefit model view human beings as *Homo economicus* who make decisions based on a utility function; each choice is given a value and is ranked based on calculations of costs and benefits. For them, individuals are rational actors. A model in which they are represented as such should thus be reasonably accurate.

The rationality assumption naturally leads the reader to the conclusion that if an individual is rational, then he must act in a certain way. This suggests that, the actions of “rational man” can be predicted. Predictability in turn facilitates the manipulation of an individual’s behavior through the effective use of costs and benefits that can change the ranking of choices or preferences in a utility function. Leites and Wolf (1970) claim that “Influencing popular behavior requires neither sympathy nor mysticism, but rather a better understanding of what costs and benefits the individual or the group is concerned with, and how they are calculated” (p. 30).

d. *The Use of Coercion as a Medium of Social Control*

Proceeding from the assumption that one’s behaviors can be manipulated in a desired way through the effective and selective use of opportunities and costs, Leites

and Wolf offer the use of persuasive (profit-maximizing) and coercive (damage-inflicting) techniques. Inspired by Machiavelli's well-known dictum that "it is better to be feared than to be loved," they believe that coercion is a more effective and responsive way of getting results than persuasive techniques or economic development programs.

Leites and Wolf (1970) assert that "limiting damage or enhancing gain may be a sufficient explanation for the behavior of the population, without recourse to more exclusive explanations concerning putative preferences or sympathies" (p. 42). For them, factors such as equality and justice are not determinative in the outcome of a rebellion, as long as a government is successful in manipulating the behavior of people through a combination of carrot-and-stick tactics. Leites and Wolf also claim that insurgent doctrine acknowledges "a central role for coercion and would optimize the use of this instrument" (p. 155). If the insurgents manage to gain the support of the population by coercion, then Leites and Wolf assume, the Authority should also be able to gain the population's support (in the sense of behavior) by using coercion even more effectively. Accordingly, the proponents of the theory assert, "the contest between R [Rebellion] and A [Authority] is often . . . a contest in the effective management of coercion" (p. 155). Since insurgents use coercion as a main instrument of gaining compliance and insurgency turns out to be a contest in the effective management of coercion, Leites and Wolf suggest that Authority must use coercion and violence selectively, intentionally, and methodically. As a moral justification for the use of coercion, they assert:

A's [Authority] doctrine . . . abjures damage-infliction against the population as a declaratory stance. . . damage-infliction on the population usually emerges as fallout from other activities rather than as conscious design. As a result, the quantum of damage inflicted by A is often inflated and capricious rather than limited and discriminating. (pp. 155-6)

Since unplanned or capricious use of coercion "run greater risks of being both bloody and vain" (Leites and Wolf 1970, p. 98), it is assumed that it would be wise for the Authority to use coercion methodically. Whether the use of coercive tactics is morally acceptable is not an issue for the strategists of the model. A selective and methodical use of coercion requires an effective intelligence system that helps government forces to differentiate the insurgents from innocent people. Without such a

system, coercive tactics will be more likely to stimulate more aggression rather than intimidate the targets and manipulate behavior in the desired direction.

e. Input-Output Model and Methods of Counterinsurgency

An important characteristic of the cost-benefit model is that it treats insurgent movements “as operating systems” that require “certain inputs – obtained from either internal or external sources – to be converted into certain outputs, or activities” (Leites and Wolf 1970, p. 32). In that model, an insurgency is described as a system that comprises insurgent organization, endogenous and exogenous factors, and Authority. Interactions among the components of the system determine the success or failure of a rebellion. Nevertheless, Leites and Wolf put insurgent organization at the heart of the system to the neglect of endogenous environmental factors, which are depicted as secondary factors that can easily be manipulated by the insurgent organization. Based on this system approach, Leites and Wolf (1970) propose four methods of counterinsurgency:

- (1) Raise the costs to R [Rebellion] of obtaining inputs, or reduce the inputs, or reduce the inputs obtained for given costs: the aim is input-denial.
- (2) Impede the process by which R converts these inputs into activities – that is, to reduce the efficiency of R’s production process.
- (3) Destroy R’s outputs.
- (4) Blunt the effects of R’s outputs on the population and on A [Authority] – that is, to increase A’s and the population’s capacity to absorb R’s activities. (p. 36)

The first two methods are described as counterproductive methods, designed to hinder “R’s production of activities by either denying inputs or changing the production coefficients so that smaller outputs are generated from given inputs.” The input-denial methods include “interdiction by air, ground, or naval action” or blockade of the logistic support of the insurgent organization; control of the movement of people, arms, food, and other material from a source to insurgents; and “preemptive buying programs” of critical material so that these goods are less readily available to insurgents.

The efforts by Authority to reduce the productive efficiency of the insurgent organization include “creating distrust and frictions” within insurgent organization by planting rumors; “attracting defectors” through amnesty for surrender programs and legislative measures; “disseminating credible misinformation” about the immorality and cruelty of the insurgent leadership; and “raising the level of noise in R’s [Rebellion’s] information system”. (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 36)

The third method, destroying the rebellion’s outputs, is the traditional counterforce role of military action. Leites and Wolf advocate the special “application of firepower from ground and air” that depends “on accurate intelligence” (1970, p. 36). Because it is generally more difficult for insurgents to regenerate higher leadership, Leites and Wolf (1970) advise the selection of insurgent higher leadership as targets instead of rank-and-file forces. Although there is a considerable amount of truth in their assumption, it must be remembered that the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party leaders, who were committed to the traditional Communist dogma of an urban-based struggle based upon the worker class, led to the rise of Mao Zedong and his rural-based protracted war strategy.

The fourth method (increasing capacity of the population and authority to absorb the insurgent organization’s outputs) is operationalized in the form of strategic passive defense measures - such as building village fortifications (hardening), relocation of villagers (evacuation), or recruitment of local defense units. Another method by which to increase the absorptive capacity of the government is “building up local defense capabilities, usually in the form of constabulary, paramilitary, or militia forces” that can protect villages and defend strategic hamlets. Obviously, the basic requirement to increase the absorptive capacity is to increase the government’s capacity “to be informed, undertake programs, control, protect, punish, and act and react vigorously, quickly, and intelligently.” (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 83)

2. Weaknesses of the Cost-Benefit Model

The cost-benefit model has its flaws. The logic underlying the model rests upon the assumption that the “population, as individuals or groups, behave rationally” (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 29). Although Leites and Wolf later admit that the “rationality assumption is . . . an oversimplification,” they do not avoid basing the whole model on

the rationality assumption (p. 30). Characterizing individuals or groups as *Homo economicus*, who base their choices on a utility function without any adherence to moral, social, or religious values, and adapting this model to politics is a precarious matter. The “Economic Man” model, which assumes that consumer behavior can accurately be predicted, and thus be effectively manipulated through selective positive and negative incentives, is subject to more than a few criticisms. First, economic man is amoral; that is, he ignores all social, religious, and ethical values unless these values contribute a tangible, measurable value to his personal utility function. Second, although the “Economic Man” model puts emphasis on the factors (costs and benefits) that are imposed by market forces (external environment), it totally ignores the factors that originate from the one’s internal environment, such as motivation, dedication to a cause, heroism, tastes, or superstitions. Another criticism has to do with universal applicability. Cost-benefit strategists assume that cost-benefit calculations can be applied not only to Western societies but also to non-Western and Third World countries. Shultz (1978) states:

The rationality assumption contains a strong ethnocentric bias. What is considered ‘rational’ behavior (economic or otherwise) in Western society does not make its opposite in a non-Western society ‘irrational.’ While ideology, commitment to a cause, and willingness to accept great sacrifices may be contrary to Western decision-making models, such choices are not necessarily irrational. (p. 114)

The application of rational decision-making models to Third World countries without reference to the cultural differences is interesting on two further grounds. First, the rational models assume “individual” as the basic unit of society as it is in most Western countries. Nevertheless, in most non-Western countries, the family, clan, or tribe is the core unit of society- not the individual. The analysis of human behavior through the lens of Western rational, decision-making models is at best insubstantiated. Second, it can be argued that the very reason that Third World countries are economically and politically backward is the fact that these countries have not done well in their cost-benefit calculations and in rational decision-making in the last three centuries. Individualism is something that is promoted and valued in the West - whereas it is largely regarded as almost a sin in non-Western societies. We do not claim that non-Western

societies are irrational, but one must be more than careful when applying Western models of rationality into other societies. In his widely acclaimed book, *“The Rational Peasant,”* Samuel Popkin (1979) noted that “Credibility, moral codes, and visions of the future . . . all affect a peasant’s estimate” (p. 262). Perhaps the right thing would be to heed “local” values in rationality assumptions instead of applying the rules of an economic model that claims to be “universal.”

Another criticism of the cost-benefit model is its inconsistent assumption that insurgents use coercion as a major tool in gaining the support of the population, and thus insurgency turns out to be a contest in the effective management of coercion. This assumption is open to debate on two grounds. First, coercion is neither the only nor the most important weapon in the insurgent arsenal. Analyzing the use of coercion and terror by the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, Shultz (1978) concluded that “Coercion and terror were only one type of tactic among many positive ones that the Front employed, and occupied a secondary position in their overall strategy” (p. 115). Second, even if we accept that insurgents use coercion widely and effectively, we cannot predict the reactions of the population to government enforced coercion. Coercion may work against insurgencies, but only when it is applied selectively and with the combination of other measures. The use of brute, indiscriminate, and uncalculated force by Authority is more likely to backfire and contribute to the insurgent cause.

A final criticism of the cost-benefit model is its sharp distinction between demand and supply factors. The strategists of the model appropriately note that market behavior is a result of both supply and demand conditions and criticize the hearts-and-minds model for ignoring the supply factors. Nevertheless, it seems that Leites and Wolf fall into the same fallacy and focus too much on supply conditions, almost totally ignoring the demand factors. By focusing too much on supply factors (mainly the insurgent organization and its relationship to the population) and ignoring environmental conditions, advocates of this model overlook the importance of demand factors – such as poverty, inequality, injustice, relative deprivation, and frustration – in the genesis of a rebellion.

C. HEARTS-AND-MINDS APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

The successful British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya not only prevented a communist takeover in the Malayan peninsula but also presented a workable, efficient strategy against communist-inspired rebellions, thereby proving that a dedicated, well organized communist organization could be defeated. The lessons and strategy of Malaya, later dubbed the “hearts and minds” approach, have been carefully scrutinized and studied by many counterinsurgency analysts. However, unlike the cost-benefit model of counterinsurgency warfare, there is no “one” textbook that frames the basic principles and foundations of the hearts-and-minds model. As a result, many politicians and professional military personnel talk about winning the hearts-and-minds of the people (mostly to create the image that they are fighting “for,” not against the people) without having more than a modest amount of knowledge about the hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency.

The lack of a main sourcebook that provides a descriptive and analytical framework for the model leads to many misunderstandings. Some perceive the model as a strategy that only deals with popular attitudes (likes and dislikes) and ignores the role of military measures. As a consequence, the proponents of the model are often viewed as being too soft, and naïve. On the other hand, other analysts believe the harsh implementation of resettlement projects, food-control punishments, and tough legal measures are themselves too ruthless. The truth, perhaps, lies somewhere between these two extreme views of the model. The traditional British strategy in small wars in general, and the hearts-and-minds model in particular, suggests the minimum use of force and maximum use of non-military measures such as administrative, economic, and police methods to include social projects. Force, when possible, should only be used in a highly selective manner. Nevertheless, we should note that the tradition of using force in a highly selective manner did not prevent the British from imposing collective punishments on entire villages.

1. Population as the Battleground of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

Unlike the cost-benefit model, which depicts popular support as a secondary and not so crucial factor in winning the war against insurgents, the hearts-and-minds model

attributes a central role to popular support. As one of the most celebrated proponents of the hearts-and-minds model, Sir Robert Thompson wrote, “An insurgent movement is a war for the people” (1966, p. 51). For the hearts-and-minds strategists, the battleground in an insurgency is not the jungles of Vietnam, Malaya, or the mountains of Algeria, but the local population. Although communist meddling, propaganda, and agitation activities done by an underground organization are still regarded as important instigators of an insurgency, the hearts-and-minds theorists claim that modernization, rapid social change, rising expectations, or relative deprivation play a significant role in the genesis of a rebellion. In other words, to use Mao’s famous dictum, if the guerrillas are fish, the water temperature must be suitable for them to survive and flourish. Analyzing the failure of the initial British response to the growing communist threat in Malaya and the policy change with the arrival of Sir Gerald Templer as the new High Commissioner, Richard Stubbs (1989) observes:

Templer considered the guerrilla war to be a battle for the hearts and minds of Malaya’s population. . . . (and) made the point that he could win the Emergency if he could get two-thirds of the people on his side. The way this was to be done . . . was by persuading the people ‘that there is another and far preferable way of life and system of beliefs than that expressed in the rule of force and the law of the jungle. This way of life is not the American way of life. It is not the British way of life. It must be the Malayan way of life.’ And, equally important, people were to be well treated and their grievances heard and when possible addressed. (pp. 147-8)

There are two facets to the insurgent problem: first, an insurgent organization provides the driving force for an insurgency; and second, that an insurgent movement to grow, there must be a suitable environment in which the insurgents can operate. The hearts-and-minds model proposes a doctrinal approach to defeating an insurgent threat that is based on three pillars. First, the government must provide security to the population and minimize threats from the insurgent organization. Second, the government must improve the economic and social conditions of people and, thus, eradicate the underlying environmental conditions that allow an insurgent organization to grow. Third, to support the first two pillars, the government must build an effective administrative structure. Shafer (1988) dubbed these three requirements the “three great *oughts*”:

Governments *ought* to secure the population from insurgent coercion. They *ought* to provide competent, legal, responsive administration free from past abuses and broader in domain, scope, and vigor. And they *ought* to meet rising expectations with higher living standards. (p. 116)

We can consider these three pillars or “*oughts*” as a tripod on which the ultimate success of the counterinsurgent strategy lies. The three pillars are not supplementary but complement each other. If one of these three pillars fails, then the whole counterinsurgency strategy must fail, too.

a. Security

The first task of the government is to keep the population secure from the coercive methods of the insurgent organization. It is argued that a government that cannot protect its citizens cannot demand allegiance from them. Nevertheless, as we analyzed in Chapter Two, coercion is neither the main nor the only weapon in the insurgent arsenal, and insurgents use a variety of tactics to gain the support of the population. Therefore, apart from protecting the population from the insurgents, the government must also work to separate the insurgents from the population. A number of programs were put into effect in Malaya to break the links between the insurgents and segments of the population that they draw support. One of the most effective methods implemented in Malaya was the resettlement or regroupment of the great bulk of Chinese squatters, who lived in the jungle without any form of administration or control. Although depicted as a civil program to save the squatters from insurgent coercion and horrible life conditions in the jungle, the process of resettling them into protected new villages was not trouble free. Analyzing the resettlement program that was launched in June 1950 and continued throughout the Emergency, John Newsinger (2002) writes:

Resettlement was not accomplished freely, but by the application of overwhelming force in order to prevent any attempt at escape or resistance. It was an emergency measure in a war that the British believed they were in serious danger of losing, and was carried out with little regard for the feelings of the Chinese. Squatter settlements were encircled by large numbers of troops and police before first light, then occupied at dawn without warning. The squatters were rounded up and allowed to take with them only what they could carry. Their homes and standing crops were fired, their agricultural implements were smashed and their livestock either killed or turned loose. . . . They were then transported by lorry to the

site of their 'new village' which was often little more than a prison camp, surrounded by a barbed wire fence, illuminated by searchlights. (p. 50)

The police forces initially provided protection to the new villages and, later, Home Guard forces, which were mainly drawn from the local population, gradually took over self-defense tasks in these villages. Despite the apparent cruelty and ruthlessness in the application of the resettlement program, these programs in the long run proved to be extremely successful in isolating the guerrillas from the population. The sharp drop in guerrilla-initiated activities demonstrated the success of the program. "As the program completed, incidents fell from a 1951 average of over five hundred a month to around one hundred a month in 1953" (Komer, 1972, p. 56). After an insurgent organization is isolated from the population, the rate of recruits that replace the killed, wounded, or surrendered insurgents drops instantly, and as a result, the insurgent organization loses the capability to regenerate itself.

b. Progress and Development

The second pillar of the hearts-and-minds model suggests that providing security to the population and breaking the link between the insurgents and the population is not sufficient to eradicate an insurgent problem. A government cannot force people to live in resettlement camps forever; security measures must be accompanied by development and assistance projects that can improve the living conditions of the people. For the hearts-and-minds proponents, insurgency is not only a military problem and the struggle must continue on all fronts: political, social, and economic. The grievances and frustrations of the people must be addressed.

Resettlement and regroupment of villages into protected and fortified camps solve the security problem for the people and government. Nevertheless, having been forcefully expelled from their villages without any compensation, and having lost almost all their wealth, these resettled villagers could easily be a new source of recruits and support for the insurgent organization. These villagers must be persuaded that living conditions in the new villages are and will be better than the life conditions in the jungle. To gain the support and to command allegiance of the populace, civic action programs are put into effect. Along with their primary aim of breaking the links between insurgents and the population, resettlement centers allowed the Malayan government to improve the

living conditions of the Chinese squatters. New villages were “provided with supplies of clean water, schools, community *centres*, basic medical care, some agricultural land, and often a few other additional services and amenities” (Stubbs, 1989, p. 250).

c. Effective Administration

In underdeveloped countries, most rural areas are beyond the administrative control of the government. The problem is not necessarily bad government, but rather undergovernment. Villagers in 1940s Vietnam, China, or Malaya may not have seen a government official for years except in urban centers and big towns. Revolutionary organizations start organizing their movement in those remote, underadministered areas in the rural parts of the country, begin establishing their politico-administrative structure as an alternative to the existing government structure, and then expand to other parts of the country through infiltration and subversion. Thus, the first task for a government is to establish an effective administrative structure and “fill the gaping void of underadministration” (McCuen, 1966, p. 96). Yet, the first two pillars – security and development – and the programs, projects, and policies derived from these two pillars would be meaningless and futile so long as effective administrative machinery to implement these projects does not exist. As Thompson (1966) aptly notes “The best of plans, programs, and policies will remain nothing but good intentions unless the machinery exists to execute them so that they make their impact throughout the country” (p. 70).

There are two overarching aims in devising an effective administrative structure. First, by establishing personal and close contact with the population, an effective administration can deny the insurgents free space in which to maneuver and can restrict and prevent insurgents from taking over the population and establishing their own alternative form of government. The existence of an effective administration also helps a government to collect correct and timely intelligence on the activities of an underground organization, and thus can help defeat an insurgency in its initial phases when it is most vulnerable. The second aim is to provide necessary services such as education, clean water, medical aid, and other community services that, in fact, should be provided by

every good government. By improving the living conditions of the people and addressing their problems, a government can expect that the population will be less susceptible to insurgent propaganda.

2. The Stick and the Carrot

The hearts-and-minds model proposes the use of both the stick and the carrot. Correctly appraising the fact that without security economic development programs must eventually fail, the strategists of the model understood the importance of coercive methods in manipulating the behavior of the population. The British in Malaya imposed long curfews, tight food control measures, collective punishments, mass deportation of entire villages, the death penalty, and other coercive measures. Nevertheless, these measures never became routine methods of punishing the population. Indeed, the British were fully aware that coercive tactics, in general, tend to alienate the population and tend to produce more sympathy and recruits for the insurgent organization. However, improving the economic condition of villagers and enhancing their lot alone could hardly persuade the people not to support the insurgent organization or support the government. As a result, the British employed both coercive and persuasive methods. The emphasis on these methods shifted from one to the other depending on the stage of the rebellion, the general attitude of the population toward the insurgent cause and government, the reaction of the people to government projects, and so on. The aim of this two-fold strategy was to “persuade the people of Malaya to abandon the MCP [Malayan Communist Party] by threatening to punish those who aided the guerrillas and, at the same time, holding out to those who supported the government the promise of greater security and a better social, economic, and political environment than the communist could offer” (Stubbs, 1989, p. 155). In the initial phases of the Emergency, more emphasis was given to the use of the “stick;” however, as the government regained the ability to provide security to some parts of the country, emphasis was gradually shifted to the use of the “carrot” in those regions. Economic development projects, educational and health service reforms, and land distribution programs helped the government to secure its temporary gains, which were achieved through coercive methods, and made those gains permanent.

3. Central Role of Intelligence

The hearts-and-minds model attributes a special importance to intelligence. During the initial phases of an insurgency, the military forces of an insurgent organization are quite weak compared to Authority. Even the strongest insurgent organizations cannot defeat a weak Authority's armed forces. Nevertheless, by using the weapons of the weak, such as terror and guerrilla warfare, and having an information advantage over the government forces, insurgents manage to transform their military weakness into strength. Government forces cannot eradicate insurgent organizations easily because insurgents hide among the people as peasants, miners, or factory workers. To defeat an insurgent organization, a government must establish an intelligence system that can nullify the information advantage of insurgents. Thompson (1966) properly asserts that "no government can hope to defeat a communist insurgent movement unless it gives top priority and is successful in building up such an (intelligence) organization" (p. 84).

The primary objective of an intelligence system is to destroy the underground component of an insurgent organization. Through its full-time and part-time cadres, insurgent organizations collect intelligence, subvert others to carry out illegal acts against the state, and establish a shadow government that controls the population. The aim must be to find these cadres and eliminate them. For this purpose, the intelligence organization must be directed to find cadres, collaborators, terrorists, and guerrillas that hide among the population. The secondary objective of devising an intelligence system is to find out information about the armed forces of the insurgent organization. With more and correct intelligence, military units can gain the initiative in fighting against guerrillas. Moreover, effective intelligence gathering allows the government forces to use selective and discriminate force. Without precise information, the use of force is likely to do more harm than good.

4. Critique of the Model

Criticisms of the hearts-and-minds model mostly focus on the lessons of Malaya. The proponents of the hearts-and-minds approach claim that the defeat of the Malayan Communist Party was largely because of the successful strategies that were implemented by the British. Additionally, the strategists of the model assume the universal

applicability of the model to other insurgency problems with only slight changes. Critics of the model claim that the British success in the Malayan experience was largely due to the unique characteristics of Malaya and to the errors of the Malayan Communist Party.

There are, indeed, unique factors that helped the British to defeat the communist insurgency. First, the popular base of the Malayan Communist Party was “almost entirely limited to a portion of the ethnic Chinese minority; it never caught on among the dominant Malay element or even the Indians” (Komer, 1972, p. 78). The British had the enthusiastic sympathy and support of the Malayan Muslims who were not very fond of ethnic Chinese. Thus, the British had a solid strategic base, which allowed them to exploit the economic and human resources of Malaya. In contrast, insurgent movements in China, Indochina, or Algeria had far deeper and broader bases of popular support.

Secondly, the Malayan peninsula was virtually an island sharing only a narrow border with Thailand. The Malayan Communist Party never received significant external aid from another state. Insurgents had to rely on domestic sources to finance and sustain the movement. This caused the insurgents to use excessive, coercive methods, which alienated the population from the insurgent cause. The lack of external aid also enhanced the effectiveness of government measures - such as resettlement programs, and tight food-control activities. The unbalanced importance of endogenous factors relative to exogenous factors in Malaya caused the advocates of the hearts-and-minds model to ignore the effect of external aid on the genesis of a rebellion. External aid can greatly improve the effectiveness of an insurgent organization. Unlike Malaya, insurgencies in Vietnam and Algeria received significant external aid.

Nevertheless, the unique factors of the Malayan insurgency do not explain why the British found themselves losing the war in the first years of the Emergency. The enforcement and coercion policy that was implemented in the first two years of the Emergency failed to defeat the communist insurgents. Only after the British shifted their strategy from a coercive strategy to a hearts-and-minds approach did the tide of the insurgency change in favor of the government.

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V. FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WAR DOCTRINE UNDER SCRUTINY: THE WAR IN ALGERIA

A. INTRODUCTION

The French Army fought against insurgencies in Indochina and Algeria from 1946 to 1962. Few armies of the world had an officer cadre that was so experienced in counterinsurgency warfare. War in Indochina and the humiliating defeat against a badly equipped enemy caused many officers to search for a doctrine that could defeat such revolutionary movements. Developed by the veterans of Indochina and put into action in Algeria by the same officer cadre, revolutionary war doctrine seemed to present an effective prescription for the decolonization wars that the French Army was facing. Nevertheless, French revolutionary war doctrine as applied in the Algerian War was doomed to failure because of its inherent weaknesses. Causing more problems than it promised to solve, the doctrine was abandoned for good after the withdrawal of the French from Algeria; ironically, many of its proponents were either in jail or in exile at the end of the war.

What are the reasons for the failure of the French counterinsurgency strategy in the Algerian Independence War? I argue that willful ignorance about the political, social, and economic grievances and the French Army's overemphasis on heavy-handed military measures caused the French to have to withdraw from Algeria.

This chapter examines the counterinsurgency strategies applied by the French Army and insurgent strategies conducted by the F.L.N. (Algerian National Liberation Front) in the Algerian Independence War between 1954 and 1962. There are two fundamental goals in this chapter: First, to analyze the evolution and characteristics of the French counterinsurgency doctrine and its consequences on the outcome of the war. The French approach to the insurgency in Algeria was largely shaped by its experiences of both the colonial wars in the 19th and 20th centuries and by the First Indochina war. By 1960, the French Army was close to beating the F.L.N. The F.L.N. was almost terminated. However, Algeria gained its independence two years later. How can we explain this? By analyzing French doctrine, this chapter attempts to highlight the importance of political and not just military strategies in countering an insurgency.

Secondly, this chapter aims to analyze the tactics and strategy of the F.L.N. and the effects of these strategies on success in a national liberation war. Additionally, the chapter will analyze the importance of popular support both in the target population and in the international arena. Apparently, the F.L.N. never enjoyed the support of the majority of the population until the 1960s. Despite the fact that it did not achieve final stage of the revolutionary war (the transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare) and had lost the military initiative by 1960, it still managed to win the war in the political arena. An analysis of insurgent strategies will provide an answer how the F.L.N. accomplished this.

B. ROOTS OF FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Two main guiding factors shaped French counterinsurgency doctrine in its wars of decolonization after the Second World War. Simply put, the first factor was the belief in a national mission by France to civilize the ‘primitive’ societies of the world. The second factor was the conviction that the West, and France in particular, was fighting a world-wide communist conspiracy that was about to destroy Western civilization.

What started as a French imperial search for power and wealth, which is what initially fueled French colonialism, later turned into a mission of civilization; that is, the ‘universal’ values of the West had to be taught to the non-Western, underdeveloped peoples. Shafer (1988) argues that “French colonialism has always been close to the Frenchmen’s sense of self-esteem and France’s place in the world” (p. 140). The belief in the uniqueness of the French way, French language, French history, and a deep sense of French superiority led the French to engage in a national “*mission civilatrice*,” a mission to civilize the backward peoples and to liberate them from their allegedly oppressive rulers. French colonial officers did not believe that indigenous cultures of various French colonies around the world had any value or anything valuable to offer to natives. Life under French rule would be more civilized, and it was assumed that French colonial rule would bring peace, prosperity, and justice. To the colonial war theorists, France was shouldering the “White Man’s Burden” for the salvation of non-white peoples.

Colonel Louis Lyautey, conqueror and governor of Morocco, believed that the French rule in Africa would liberate the native peoples from interethnic violence and from their oppressive traditional rulers. Lyautey, like most of the colonial officers, “was

an evangel of *la mission civilatrice*, France's mission to bring civilization to less fortunate peoples." However, his values did not prevent Lyautey from resorting to brutality. "If [French troops] could not punish the guilty, they would punish whom they could" (Joes, 2004, pp. 219-220).

Shafer (1988) argues that "the conviction of a national *mission civilatrice* underpinned both strains of French colonial theory" (p. 141). The first one, *assimilation*, called on France to 'civilize' the natives and ultimately incorporate them as full citizens in a greater France. According to the second, *association*, France would lead and natives would perform in accordance with their capabilities in a permanent master-subject "partnership" Nevertheless, French pride did not allow "inferior peoples" to be full citizens of a French Union with equal rights. Of the two attitudes, the latter (a permanent master-subject partnership in which the French would be the leading partner) overwhelmed the former. France treated the natives of her colonies as second-class, primitive peoples, and did not realize the necessity of implementing reforms to reduce the level of frustration and humiliation. When France adopted certain reforms, it was generally too little and too late.

As for the second guiding factor – that the West was against a world-wide communist conspiracy and that France was shouldering this burden alone – this was more important to most theoreticians of the "*la guerre revolutionnaire*." According to Peter Paret (1964), the French revolutionary warfare theoreticians' "implicit belief that contemporary events -such as anticolonialism- can be understood only in the light of a world-wide Communist conspiracy; its ties with colonial warfare and the effort to make colonial experiences applicable to all violent and nonviolent international conflicts" must be basic to any study of the doctrine (p. 4). According to Shafer (1988) "the theoreticians of revolutionary war saw the threat of Soviet sponsored revolutionary wars everywhere. . . that the Soviet's revolutionary war strategy . . . is not a direct assault, but a wide, encircling movement passing by China, the Far East, India, the Middle East, Egypt, and North Africa, finally to strangle Europe" (p. 150).

The French persistence in labeling nationalist aspirations as an extension of a world-wide conspiracy prevented them from seeing the real causes of the rebellion. Thompson (1994) argues that:

the French Army viewed counter-insurgency as a fight to the death against Communism, but did not address the political aspirations of the local population in order to understand the appeal of Communism. . . . Too many officers viewed themselves as Crusaders against Communism and therefore failed to realize that nationalism was at the root of insurgency. (p. 22-23)

C. DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

Although French experience against guerrillas is usually associated with struggles in Indochina and Algeria, the French Army had a long history of wars against insurgencies. In fact, the word “guerrilla” (“little war”) is derived from the Peninsular War in Spain fought between 1808 and 1814. During the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1815), France fought a whole series of campaigns against irregular opponents, including the Vendean Revolt (1793-1796) in France, the insurrection in Haiti (1791-1802), and most famously, the Russian campaign of 1812 (Beckett, 2001, p.71).

As a result of these wars against insurgents, three major figures emerged in the field of French counterinsurgency: Robert-Thomas Bugeaud (1784-1849), Joseph Gallieni (1849-1916), and Louis Lyautey (1854-1934).

More French soldiers died in the Peninsular War than in the Russian campaign. However, in none of those campaigns did the French develop an effective counterinsurgency strategy against insurgents or partisans. It was Robert-Thomas Bugeaud, a veteran of the Peninsular War, who recognized the errors of French military tactics. Bugeaud became governor-general and commander-in-chief in Algeria in 1840. The newly founded French Foreign Legion invaded Algeria in 1830. Yet after a decade, the natives of Algeria – the Arabs, and the Berbers – had still not fully submitted to French rule. They waged a war of hit-and-run tactics against the French Army under the leadership of Abd el-Kader. Abandoning the strategy of static fortifications and heavy columns, Bugeaud introduced the technique of the “flying column,” which was a light, all-arms formation of weak brigade strength that was mobile enough to pursue the guerrillas, but at the same time powerful enough to deal with a rebel band. When

combined with the strategy of *ratissage* or *razzia* (which is a great sweep or drive with extended fronts designed to deprive the enemy of supplies by destroying his economic resources, such as crops and herds), the “flying column” technique proved extremely effective. “Bugeaud took the war to the insurgents to build new posts from which light columns could achieve further penetration and from which officers of *Bureau Arabe* could be deployed to administer the population and to disrupt the insurgents’ cohesion by means of political warfare” (Beckett, 1988, pp. 41-42). With the combination of a military and political strategy, Bugeaud finally defeated Abd el-Kader in 1844. Although Bugeaud’s tactics were successful, they were criticized due to indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians and brutal tactics such as the *ratissage*.

Joseph Gallieni adapted and refined Bugeaud’s approach in French Indochina and Madagascar in the 1890s. Gallieni was the father of the *tache d’huile* strategy (the oil-stain analogy by which French control would spread gradually into the interior as oil spreads upon water) (Beckett, 2001, p. 72). The oil-stain technique represented a methodical expansion of French control:

First, a chain, then a network of posts were established. Each unit served as a nucleus of military, administrative, and propagandist action...Patrols between them prevented the re-establishment of opposition in the intermediary areas. As control was extended, villages in the relatively secure zones were armed and made responsible for their own defenses; concurrently, natives were organized into auxiliary Army units, so that a large part of the population became committed to the French cause. (Paret, 1964, p. 104)

A. J. Joes (2004) argues that “an essential part of this technique was that soon after military occupation was completed, civil administration came with the aim of attracting native support by promoting peace, prosperity, and justice” (p.219).

Lyautey, an able disciple and accomplice of Gallieni, relayed his ideas about colonial war in his article “*Du role colonial de l’armee*,” and became the leading advocate and theoretician of the “oil-stain” technique (Beckett, 1988, p. 47). The theory requires that military action and political action must be planned and executed together:

The military phase of the occupation, or pacification, was prepared or accompanied by political action. Natives in as yet unconquered regions were subjected to propaganda stressing the twin themes that life was better

under French rule and that only French was strong enough to keep the peace. Whenever suitable, segments of the population were turned against their rulers, or tribal leaders were set against each other. As the Army established control, it imposed its administration, which extended from the purely military realm of defense to the maintenance of roads, the building of schools and medical centers, the collecting of taxes, and the landing down of justice. (Paret, 1964, p. 104)

When French expeditionary forces occupied a country, they also established the French administrative structure to control newly occupied areas and natives. As Lyautey wrote:

When the occupation of a new territory is decided on for political or administrative reasons, we never proceed by ‘spear thrusts of columns,’ keeping the problems of organization in abeyance until the end of the operation; on the contrary, all the elements of the final occupation and organization are ensured in advance. . . . It is indeed an ‘organization that marches.’ (Paret, 1964, p. 105)

Paret’s (1964) comment about this is “For the smooth progress of pacification, (according to colonial officers) close cooperation between civil and military authority was obviously essential. The best (way to) ensure this . . . was to create actual unity of command” (p. 105). It is needless to say that by defending the principle of “unity of command,” the theorists imply the convention of full political and military control at the hands of the soldiers. These *officier-administrateurs* conquered and ruled the large parts of the French colonial empire.

In 1891 Lyautey published an article on the social duties of the French officer, and called on his comrades to acknowledge their dual role of leaders in war and educators in peacetime. Lyautey’s thesis did not influence the Army as a whole, but many officers were inspired by his ideas. The idea of *l’officier-educateur* would later cause problems.

The enemies the French had faced in the colonies prior to the Second World War were largely tribal and lacked any unifying political ideology. As Beckett (2001) describes them, the “Vietminh, whom the French were to face in Indochina between 1946 and 1954, not only possessed a strong political organization but also were able to appeal beyond their communist ideology to Vietnamese nationalism” (p.72). However, the French responded to the Vietnamese insurrection as they had responded to any tribal

rebellion in Algeria or Morocco in the 19th century. The French response was exclusively military. They used fortified posts to control the strategic positions and logistical lines in order to dominate an area and draw the Vietminh into a conventional war in which French could easily defeat the guerrillas.

Failing to adapt to the new tactics of the Vietminh, the French endured a humiliating defeat and withdrew from Indochina in 1954. However, the war in Indochina created a new generation of officers, whose experiences in Indochina led them to seek a new strategy to defeat the new threat; that is, revolutionary war.

D. THE DOCTRINE: “LA GUERRE REVOLUTIONNAIRE”

1. Revolutionary War

Guerre revolutionnaire (revolutionary war) is the doctrine that the French Army developed after its defeat by the Vietminh in Indochina. The ideas and experiences of the pioneers of revolutionary war were influenced and shaped by the First Indochinese War. Their solutions were a response to the Vietnamese version of Maoist People’s War and the universal applicability of the doctrine is open to question. Paret (1964) notes:

the doctrine of *guerre revolutionnaire* deals with two major areas of conflict: The first area comprises the nature, characteristics, and processes of modern revolution, which the doctrine treats haphazardly...and with little sophistication. The second area, which covers the principles and techniques of waging war against revolution, is closely and elaborately explored in the doctrine. (p. 20)

Luttwak and Koehl (1991) define revolutionary war as an “armed conflict between a government and opposing forces, wherein the latter rely mainly on guerrilla warfare and subversion rather than formal warfare.” The objective of the war is the assumption of governmental authority. The authors appropriately note that “(The) revolutionary side operates by establishing a rival state structure which embodies a political ideology, and which is intended to replace the existing order...In revolutionary war, the winning side out-administers, rather than out-fights the loser” (p. 487). There are two main features in the definition: first, the war is asymmetric; that is, two sides do not fight in the same manner, and there exists a rather significant contrast between the two sides in terms of resource power, weapons, and financial power; second, the aim of the war should be to out-administer the other side rather than to out-fight it. Population is the

target in a people's war and "development of nucleus of peasant support by economic and social grievances and also, most importantly, on nationalist feelings, built up by a skillful combination of propaganda and terrorism" is vital to the insurgents because only through population do the insurgents acquire necessary resources and intelligence (Blaufarb, 1977, p.11). The main threat to the government is not the guerrilla, but the subversion; that is, activities meant to achieve hidden, but effective, control over a population.

Colonel Georges Bonnet's formula expresses the basic composition of the French doctrine of revolutionary warfare:

Partisan warfare + psychological warfare = revolutionary warfare
(Beckett, 2001, p.90)

Paret (1964) argues that Colonel Bonnet's formula directs attention to the doctrine's salient point:

the complete interdependence between the violent and nonviolent features of the internal war, not alone in the methods used but also in the targets chosen. Revolutionary war postulates an insurgent party that will direct its efforts at least as much at the inhabitants of the territory whose control is at stake as against the armed forces of the incumbent power. (pp. 10-11)

Not only are the two features of the internal war interdependent, but also the population and guerrillas are interdependent in the revolutionary's mind. "The populace, according to the population by Mao Tse-tung that has become one of the favorite quotations of the French theorists, is for the army what water is for fish." (Paret, 1964, p. 11)

The whole modern revolutionary process was divided into five stages by Commandant Hogard:

- (1) Preliminary reconnaissance of the population
- (2) Organization of several networks of independent hierarchies, building the infrastructure of propagandists, agitators, spies, and political leaders
- (3) Formation of armed bands; agitation, sabotage, and terror.
- (4) Creation of "liberated zones." Establishment of provisional government. international legitimacy. Formation of a regular army.

- (5) General psychological, political, and military offensive against the government and its armed forces. (Paret, 1964, pp. 12-15)

Here, it must be remembered that an insurgent organization does not have to follow these steps simultaneously or in a rigid sequence. The revolutionary process may follow different paths of development in different regions. Moreover, a revolution can succeed without achieving the fifth stage.

2. Counterrevolutionary War

The French equally analyzed the principles and techniques of waging war against a revolution. They argued that the incumbent's efforts should be directed against the weak points of the subversive process:

- (1) The superiority of the ethical code of the West, which is assumed by these theorists, should give it an advantage over the enemy, as long as it shows equal aptitude in the use of psychological warfare.
- (2) The early development of subversion requires a great deal of time. The enemy forges his weapon under the eyes of legal authorities and can only hope that security forces do not interfere before he is ready.
- (3) At the outset, the insurgents scarcely ever possess an adequate logistical base.
- (4) The insurgents can draw out the struggle for very long periods, but are almost never able to deal with decisive military blows.
- (5) Most importantly, the conquest and control of the population is based on the existence of an infrastructure, the clandestine politico-military network of cells, activists, and sympathizers covering the country. If this organization of ideological elites is broken up, the war collapses. (Paret, 1964, p.21)

To exploit these weaknesses, the government's military, political, and psychological efforts must be closely interconnected:

- (1) The rebels must be cut off from foreign assistance.

- (2) The enemy's regular forces and larger guerrilla groupings must be destroyed. Every success must be exploited by psychological operations aimed at fostering demoralization and desertion.
- (3) Communications and essential administrative and economic centers must be protected by a network of small posts.
- (4) It may be necessary to undertake resettlement of communities in order to deny these potential bases to the enemy and at the same time to facilitate their supervision and protection.
- (5) The captured rebels should be re-educated. (Paret, 1964, p.23)

General Allard defined a pair of missions to implement the theory in the field. He argued that

In revolutionary war, pure military action . . . takes a back seat to psychological action, to propaganda, to the collecting and exploiting of political as well as operational intelligence, to police measures, to personal contacts with the population, to social and economic progress, etc. (revolutionary war can be divided into) two categories: Destruction and Construction. These two terms are inseparable. To destroy without building up would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion. Destruction aims to realize many missions; however, the first aim is to uncover, dismantle, and suppress the rebel politico-military framework. (Paret, 1964, p.30)

However, destruction cannot solve the insurgent problem alone. Shafer (1988) argues that "If victory is to be lasting, however, the destruction of the insurgent organization must be followed by 'the construction of peace' and 'establishment of a new order'" (p.156). The destruction and construction phases do not necessarily have to be sequential. They can be implemented simultaneously.

Construction of a new order, argue the theorists, is mainly a task of pacification. General Allard notes that pacification means "organizing the people, separating them into hierarchies; that is, to say, substituting for the political and administrative organization of the F.L.N. . . at the lowest echelon of the future (social and administrative) organization of Algeria. . . ." (Paret, 1964, p. 31). Such an authoritarian style of administration did not have anything to do with reforms, nor did it diminish the economic and social grievances

of the society. Rather the aim was to build a system in which they could control everyone. "Call me a fascist if you like," Trinquier declared, "but we must make the population docile and manageable; everybody's acts must be controlled" (Shafer, 1988, p. 156).

E. POPULAR SUPPORT

Revolutionaries consider mass support the primary condition for their success; winning and maintaining popular support remains their central objective throughout the struggle. The fish and guerrilla analogy was very popular among the theoreticians of *guerre revolutionnaire*. Paret (1964) argues that "since guerrillas and terrorists are dependent for the survival and effectiveness on the cooperation, or at least neutrality and passivity, of the people among whom they operate the winning-over of, the population forms an area in which the two forces overlap" (p. 10). The French understood the importance of the population to the insurgents and did much to separate the insurgents from the population. However, the analogy assumes the separability of the fish and water, whereas in real life it is almost impossible to differentiate between innocent civilians and supporters of the insurgent organization. As Shafer (1988) writes:

by assuming that the insurgent organization is a distinct, foreign imposition upon the population...their prey proved elusive because the category "enemy" was more complex than their definition allowed and because, in fact, sea and fish were often indistinguishable. As a result, the French, unable to target their 'destroy' campaigns, accurately, destroyed thousands of innocent lives. (p. 156).

The French approach and the methods used to isolate the guerrillas was best expressed in General Challe's words "The theory, the famous theory of water and fish of Mao Tse-tung, which has achieved much, is still very simple and very true: If you withdraw the water; that is to say, the support of the population, fish can no longer live. It's simple, I know, but in war only the simple things can be achieved"(Paret, 1964, p. 42). The simple rationale of "withdrawing water" led to horrible consequences in the Algerian war; more than two million people - twenty to twenty-five percent of the entire population - were resettled into internment camps, and entire villages were bombed and wiped out to punish the 'insurgents' (Shafer, 1988, p.157).

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Luttwak and Koehl (1991) define psychological war as “all measures designed to influence enemy personnel (including political leaders) to serve the manipulator’s purposes” (p. 471). The tools of psychological warfare include the presentation or distortion of images, the coordination of military and / or diplomatic action in order to create certain images, and the exploitation of existing tensions within the enemy camp in order to affect morale, discipline, or the decision-making context. To the French theoreticians of the revolutionary war:

[psychological] warfare is implied in all violent and non-violent measures taken primarily to influence the opponent, the population, and one’s own forces as well as foreign public opinion and governments. The term thus covers everything from local rumors to terroristic acts to impress the population, and propaganda to such full-scale diplomatic action and maneuvers supporting a rebel cause in the United Nations. (Paret, 1964, p.10)

The humiliating defeat by a backward, badly equipped enemy (the Vietminh), the level of political conviction of the insurgent cadres, and the collapse of morale in regular units caused the theoreticians of *guerre revolutionnaire* to emphasize psychological factors.

In the Algerian conflict, the *5es Bureaux* had two main tasks: First, *action psychologique*, aimed at protecting French morale and unity of purpose among the civilians as well as the military. Second, *guerre psychologique* carried psychological war to the enemy in order to deprive him of his supporters and destroy his will to fight. Three objectives describe *guerre psychologique*:

- (1) To help destroy the enemy’s political network
- (2) To help destroy the enemy’s armed forces (through demoralization [leaflets, pamphlets, loudspeakers] and desertion)
- (3) To re-educate captured enemy personnel. (Paret, 1964, pp. 56-57)

The importance of psychological warfare is best expressed in the words of Colonel Lacheroy: “The mass is for the taking. How do you take it? The technique is ‘psychological impregnation – the release of stimuli, the elaboration of the slogans

adapted to the situation, the incessant repetition of affirmations, and the systematic reiteration of biased information by all means of dissimulation.” Shafer criticized this approach and noted that “(according to the theoreticians of *guerre psychologique*) if skillful indoctrination (by the insurgents) could create revolution from ‘nothing,’ then equally skillful counterindoctrination could create counterrevolution” (Shafer, 1988, p.158). The French assumption that insurgency was an externally imposed communist conspiracy apparently blinded them to seeing the underlying causes, and led them to believe that only through propaganda (and without addressing any substantive social or economic grievances), the population could be won over. “The Muslims,” Shafer writes “found little inspiring in the Army’s claim that ‘it is the fate of the West and Christendom that are at stake in Algeria” (p. 159).

G. FRONT DE LIBERATION NATIONALE: ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

1. Organization

Although French revolutionary war theorists believed that they were again fighting against a Communist organization, the F.L.N was in fact a nationalist movement, without a coherent political agenda other than the Algerian nationalism. According to Fairbairn (1974):

The Algerian liberation movement (F.L.N.) was . . . to some extent an organizational replica of the Communist model, in its command structure, cells and so on. . . . The F.L.N., though it argued in general terms that it sought only a politically independent Algeria, had an elitist leadership which also used the Marx-Leninist explanations for its struggle against capitalist exploitation. (pp. 205-206)

The tactics it used, its organizational structure, and the type of countries it sought arms and weapons from all led many analysts to view the F.L.N. as another communist insurrection similar to those in Indochina, the Philippines, or Malaya. Yet, as Charles Shrader (1999) points at “The ideological basis of the Algerian rebellion was nationalism, and the rebels’ primary goal was complete independence from France” (p. 132).

It is obvious that the F.L.N. leaders and cadres were influenced by the resistance movements against the Germans in the Second World War and by the success of the Vietnamese version of People’s War. In fact, many Algerian soldiers who fought in

Indochina against the Vietminh joined the F.L.N. after the withdrawal of French from Indochina. According to O'Neill (1990), "organizational methods [of the F.L.N.] were borrowed from both the Communist party and the French colonial administration and pragmatically adopted to local needs" (p. 92).

The F.L.N. was created by the members of a splinter group inside the Messali's (heroic and charismatic leader of Algerian nationalism) M.T.L.D called "*Organisation Speciale*" (O.S.). The advocates of an overt armed insurrection against the French formed a secret Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA). In July, a meeting took place outside Algiers, comprising the CRUA and the leading revolutionary operatives from all over Algeria, which took the name of "The Committee of Twenty-two." Here, a fundamental decision, from which the F.L.N. never wavered, was made: "the armed revolt under preparation would not be a single blow aimed at drawing concessions from France, but an 'unlimited revolution' *a outrance* to continue until full independence was achieved" (Horne, 1977, p. 79).

The objective of CRUA was to plan and execute an armed rebellion against the French until full independence was achieved. On 10 October, 1954, the CRUA decided to launch an armed revolt on 1 November, 1954, and the movement adopted a new name; *Front de Liberation Nationale* (F.L.N.). The armed insurrection began on 1 November 1954 as it was planned. On the same day, the political and military functions of the F.L.N. were split into two. The political functions of the movement and responsibility for obtaining diplomatic, financial, and military assistance were entrusted to an "External Delegation," while the military commanders of the provinces (*wilayas*) formed the "Internal Delegation" with the responsibility of recruiting, arming, and training the rebel fighters and waging the armed struggle (Shrader, 1999, pp. 135-136).

In the summer of 1956, the leaders of the movement came together at Soummam "to iron out internal differences and re-establish the basic unity of the revolution, and at the same time attempt to define its principles." Two important decisions were made at the summit: "First, the primacy of political over military; second, the primacy of the 'forces of the interior' over the 'exterior'" (Horne, 1977, p. 143). Furthermore, the principle of collective leadership was reaffirmed in the summit. The reason for collective leadership

principle was that there was no candidate of outstanding stature, and to have selected either an Arab or a Kabyle might have run the grave risk of alienating one or other race and might deteriorate the internal rifts. Another important decision was that there was to be no cease-fire between recognition of independence and negotiation, only on the basis of the existing Algerian territory. There was to be no double citizenship privileges for the *pied noirs*.

2. Strategy and Tactics

The decision made at the Committee of Twenty-two in 1954 that “the armed revolt under preparation would not be a single blow aimed at drawing concessions from France, but an ‘unlimited revolution’ *a outrance* to continue until full independence was achieved” formed the basis of F.L.N. strategy throughout the war. Leaders of the F.L.N. were well aware that they could not defeat the French Army in a short, conventional campaign, but that they could impose enough costs through a protracted people’s war to force them to withdraw from Algeria.

Although there were some minor influences from French Army and its doctrine in the F.L.N. military strategy, in general, the F.L.N.’s strategic plan and tactical doctrine was influenced by Vietminh tactics in Indochina. The political objective of the F.L.N., and thus the strategic objective of the A.L.N., was to secure the independence of Moslem Algeria by forcing the withdrawal of the French political and military administration. The military strategy aimed to achieve the political objective was based on a three-phase strategy devised by Mao Tse-tung:

- (1) The establishment of a viable military force and a supporting infrastructure, with overt military action limited to defensive actions and small scale ambushes, raids, and acts of terrorism.
- (2) In the second phase, the rebel forces were to initiate more substantial direct action to harass and demoralize the enemy while continuing to build up their own military strength. Offensive military action during the second phase might include larger ambushes and raids, coordinated attacks on enemy facilities and lines of communications, and limited campaigns to secure resources and influence popular opinion.

- (3) The rebel forces, having been organized and equipped as a conventional army, would pass over to a sustained full-scale offensive campaign to eliminate enemy military and political organs or force their withdrawal from the field. (Shrader, 1999, pp.145-146)

F.L.N. tactics were similar to the typical guerrilla tactics such as “hit-and-run” methods, avoiding enemy strength and attacking Authority’s weaknesses along with an emphasis on security, surprise, and deception.

H. THE WAR AND THE FRENCH RESPONSE

1. All Saint’s Day and Initial French Response

The choice of All Saint’s Day as the beginning date for the armed struggle was not accidental. The day had symbolic meaning for the Catholic *pied noirs* and maximum propaganda effect would be achieved on such a day. C.R.U.A. finalized its plans, borrowing organizationally from the experiences of both the French wartime resistance and, more recently, the Viet-Minh. The country was divided into six autonomous regions, or *Wilayas*, giving the rebellion an integral structure that it would retain over the next seven and a half years. Operation groups would be formed in watertight compartments, with no more than four or five trusted men knowing each other. “On D-Day, each group leader was to act in accordance with a very precise plan, and attacks were to be directed against specific public installations, private property of the grand colons, French military personnel and gendarmes, and Muslim collaborators”(Horne, 1979, pp.83-89).

“On the night of October 31, 1954, some seventy violent acts shattered the calm throughout Algeria. . . . During the first twenty-four hours of the rebellion, seven persons were killed and four others were wounded” (Heggoy, 1972, p. 67). At the first emergency meeting, authorities agreed that “the revolt was not so dangerous, and that it could soon be crushed with recourse to swift and draconian repressive measures” (p. 96). The French reaction to the attacks was typical; indiscriminate mass arrests (most were innocent people) and a sweeping police action throughout the country. Many of the activists were caught, and police easily broke down the F.L.N. infrastructure in Algiers.

After the first winter, the situation in the rebel side was far from encouraging. The revolt touched bottom, with little more than 350 fighters. Horne (1979) notes that “the

balance sheet for the first winter in terms of rebel manpower alone, on the debit side the “old guard” had been largely mopped-up; on the credit side, there was a plentiful substitution of new recruits resulting from the indiscriminate mass arrests in the cities and overzealous *ratissages* in the *bled*” (p. 104) .

The initial French response to the F.L.N. threat was not much different from the methods used by Lyautey at the beginning of the 20th century. Later, as the disciples of *guerre revolutionnaire* took power in Algeria, the French Army developed more effective countermeasures. Of those measures, three are noteworthy: S.A.S. units, resettlement policies, and the Morice line.

2. S.A.S. (*Section Administrative Specialisee*)

The first S.A.S. units were formed as early as September 1955, and consisted of civil-affairs officers who had served in Morocco and in the Sahara. An earlier historical precedent to the S.A.S. system was the *Bureaux Arabes* of the nineteenth century. The S.A.S. was designed to overcome a long-term, colonial deficiency - the under-administration of the interior areas of Algeria. The S.A.S. aim was to:

take into their protective net populations in the remoter *bled* that might otherwise become subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the army – or both. Some 400 S.A.S. detachments were created, each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration - from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administrative justice. (Horne, 1979, pp. 107-109).

The S.A.S. officers’ duties were not only limited to economical and administrative areas, but they were also responsible for the collection of intelligence for the local troops. Although the S.A.S. system achieved relatively significant success (considering the French Army’s bad record) in winning the support of the population, there were some S.A.S. officers “who transformed the S.A.S. into ‘intelligence centers,’ where torture was not unknown” (Horne, 1979, p. 109). In the end, the S.A.S. failed in its task of gaining the support of the majority of the Algerians. Asprey (1975) writes that “its [S.A.S.’s] fault lay in attempting to sell an inferior product, French hegemony, to (those) who had already tried and rejected it” (p. 924).

3. Resettlement Policy

Resettlement of civilian populations is a principal means employed by armies since 1945. The logic of resettling people in certain areas originated with the fish and water analogy. The British resettled Chinese squatter communities (rural people occupying illegal settlements on government-owned land) to cut their support to the guerrillas in Malaya. Nevertheless, resettlement must be undertaken with the utmost care and preparation, otherwise the resettlement policy is doomed to failure. Resettlement policies in Algeria aimed at diverting the water away from the fish by isolating communities from the F.L.N. and thus denying it refuge and supplies. Over a million peasants from “exposed” communities were resettled in barbed-wire encampments, which often looked horribly like concentration camps. Alfred Andrew Heggoy (1972) notes that “roughly half of the three million people who, in 1960, did not live in the same house as in 1954 were displaced because of this policy” (p.213).

Although resettlement policies decreased the level and intensity of rebel activities, they did more harm than good. According to Peter Paret (1964):

if their transfer eased operations against the F.L.N., it did little to gain adherents to the French cause. Nor was it possible to prevent infiltration in the new communities. A more favorable ground for subversion could hardly be imagined than the resettlement centers, with the concentrated hatred and frustration of thousands. (p. 45)

While resettlement policies may well weaken an insurgent organization and isolate the rebels from the population, these policies must be implemented with great care and must be accompanied by social, political, and economic development programs.

4. Morice Line

The Morice line was the physical barrier erected by the French in 1957 to prevent infiltration of the F.L.N. agents into Algeria from neighboring Tunisia. The line stretched 200 miles, from the Mediterranean coast into the Sahara. Its object was to contain the war and check the increasing supply of arms and *djounoud* (Algerian guerrillas). The logic of the Morice line originated from the idea of cutting external aid to the insurgents. The barrier was supplemented with mine fields, an electric fence charged with 5,000 volts, and electric sensors to detect any attempts to cut through. Eighty troops were positioned to protect the barrier and prevent infiltration attempts. Although extremely costly to

protect in terms of expenditures and personnel, the Morice line proved to be very successful and effective. The French reckoned they prevented 35 percent of the infiltration attempts by January 1958, the ratio increased to 80 percent after the Morice line was finished. (Beckett, 2001, p.158)

Roger Trinquier (1961), a leading theoretician of *guerre revolutionnaire*, best expressed the effectiveness of the barrier:

In Algeria, drawing on past experience, we have managed to set up a fragile, but tight, barrier of indisputable effectiveness. If our opponents are stalemated, if they have not been successful in creating guerrilla units larger than company size, it is in large part because the border fence has not permitted them to receive the supplies vital to the normal development of their activities. The guerrilla operates sporadically, intending more to maintain his hold over the rural population than to disturb the forces of order. It is therefore more toward terrorism in the cities that they have bent their efforts, principally because this type of action calls for a minimum of materiel. (p.100)

I. THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS

The so-called Battle of Algiers, the most important and publicized part of the war, was an intensive struggle for the control of the city. It started as a response to the execution of captured F.L.N. members who had been sentenced to death by the French authorities. The F.L.N. initiated an indiscriminate terror campaign against civilians in Algiers. Unable to stop the attacks, Governor-General Lacoste called General Massu's division in to both prevent the F.L.N. attacks and control the backlash of *piéd noir* mobs. Having acquired full control of the city, General Massu then imposed total military control by constant patrolling, house-to-house searches, and checkpoints. Massu seized the police files and instituted large scale arrests, which enabled the French to build up a detailed intelligence picture of the F.L.N.'s organization; a system of "collective responsibility" was also introduced by Roger Trinquier. Every sector, neighborhood, and block was numbered; identity cards were issued to every person living in the Casbah. An effective intelligence system was established and interrogation centers were set up. The Forces of Order tortured the guilty and the innocent indiscriminately in an attempt to obtain information. As a result of effective police techniques, indiscriminate mass arrests,

and widespread use of torture, the French destroyed the terrorist network within months. Most of the rebels were captured or killed and terrorist attacks in Algiers stopped. (Beckett, 2001, p. 8)

The Battle of Algiers was a tactical victory for the French; however, the F.L.N. reaped immense political gains from the methods the French used. After the Battle of Algiers the difference between Algerians and Europeans became markedly clearer, and hatred of French rule increased dramatically.

The use of torture had far-reaching effects. French public opinion was negatively influenced by the news of torture as a routine method of intelligence collection. The socialist government in France had to commission Roger Wullaume to compile an investigative report on the use of torture in Algeria (Merom, 2003, p. 112). Wullaume noted that “like the legalising of a rampant black market, torture should be institutionalized because it had become so prevalent, as well as proving effective in neutralising many terrorists” (Horne, 1979, p. 196). In his report, not only did Wullaume acknowledge the use of torture in Algeria, but actually recommended sanctioning it because, on the one hand, Wullaume decided it was effective and indispensable, and on the other, he concluded that it could not be concealed. But, even though torture seemed to be effective in terms of achieving military goals, it was causing the French to lose the battle of ideas in the world political arena. Edward Behr posits that “without torture, the F.L.N.’s terrorist network would never have been overcome . . . however, torture is a double-edged weapon. In the name of efficacy, illegality has become justified” (Horne, 1979, 198). The French won the Battle of Algiers, but that meant losing the war.

J. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE WAR, POLITICAL OUTCOMES AND HOW THE FRENCH LOST

One of the initial objectives of the F.L.N. had been the internationalization of the war. On the diplomatic level, the F.L.N.’s most outstanding early success was to be invited to the Bandung Conference in April 1955. Though not officially representing a sovereign state, the F.L.N.’s presence at the conference was a solid victory for the organization and its long-term goals. Notwithstanding such victories, the F.L.N.’s struggle to internationalize the war in Algeria was not fully realized until the Battle of

Algiers and the commission of French atrocities. The French were chagrined that the F.L.N.'s internationalization attempts were being well received and were creating more positive public opinion in the United States and the United Kingdom. Just, as the Battle of Algiers had publicized the war in France, heated debates in political circles and the anti-torture campaign in the press led by the intelligentsia resonated in British and American liberal opinion. (Horne, 1979, pp. 242-245)

The F.L.N.'s struggle to bring the Algerian issue to the United Nations General Assembly was staunchly opposed by the French under the pretext that it was a domestic issue; hence, the United Nations had no jurisdiction. The F.L.N. was mostly supported by the Afro-Asian group and the Arab League in the United Nations. Even though the Algerian issue being brought to the attention of the United Nations had a significant impact on Western powers and the rest of the world and helped to gain publicity for the movement, the F.L.N. did not succeed in reaching its goals through the United Nations. (Heggoy, 1972, pp. 253-258)

Despite the aforementioned developments and serious F.L.N. efforts in the political struggle, the organization could not achieve its objectives. It was instead, developments in France that brought independence to Algeria. As Taber (2002) explains "The protracted war in Algeria finally brought Paris to a painful choice: French prestige, the natural wealth of Algeria and the political weight of a million colons on the one hand, political turmoil, continued frustration, and a deadly drain on the national economy on the other" (p. 115).

The unstable political setting of the Fourth Republic was further aggravated by events in Algeria. The French Army was implicated in the overthrow of the Fourth Republic in May 1958, which brought General Charles de Gaulle to the presidency of the Fifth Republic. The advocates of *guerre révolutionnaire* in the French Army significantly affected the fall of the Fourth Republic. However, de Gaulle realized that the war in Algeria could not be won and offered self-determination to the Algerians, which had a shocking effect on the French generals who had helped de Gaulle gain power. The politicization of the Army culminated in an attempted coup against de Gaulle led by General Salan and three other French generals in Algiers in April 1961. De Gaulle began

negotiations with the F.L.N. shortly hereafter and an agreement was achieved in March 1962. Algeria became independent after an eight-year war with terrible memories and devastating effects on the Algerian nation.

K. CONCLUSION

Paret (1964) argues that “whatever her policies and methods, France after 1954 could have maintained her dominance over Algeria only if the political system and intent of the country had been reshaped along totalitarian lines” (p. 123). The prescription for the Algerian question that the supporters of the *guerre revolutionnaire* in the French Army offered was no less than authoritarian control of society. Yet, in the end, the eight-year war in Algeria caused the fall of the Fourth Republic, brought France to the edge of a civil war, and resulted in a death toll of over one million people in eight years.

The overall lessons of the Algerian war are concisely expressed in the words of Bard O’Neill (1990);

Unlike the Chinese experience, the Algerians were never able to make the transition to the conventional warfare stage, because the French were able to rectify early military deficiencies and thereby defeat the insurgents militarily. But, while French won on the battlefield, the Algerians won the war. The reason for that paradox was that the Algerians were able to maintain widespread popular support and wear down French resolve through skillful propaganda efforts at home and abroad, to exploit violent excesses by the French (torture and terrorism), and to pose the prospect of a costly and interminable struggle. (p. 39)

France could have won the war and retained her control over Algeria for a limited period of time, but eventually, following the tide of decolonization and national liberation movements throughout the world during the 1960s and the 1970s, Algeria would have demanded and obtained its independence. Simply put, Algeria belonged to a different civilization and, given the upsurge of nationalism and weakening of the European powers after the Second World War, there is no good reason to assume that Algeria would have remained part of France even had there been much higher standards of living and a much lower rate of unemployment. (Laqueur 1976, p. 299)

One of the many weaknesses of the doctrine of *guerre revolutionnaire* was that it underestimated the power of popular support and instead fervently and irrationally insisted on viewing Communism as the cause of the war. Although the doctrine was very

effective at the tactical and operational levels, it failed to consider the effects of these tactics in the political arena. The French experience of counter-revolutionary war was completely military in character. Ignorance about the political, social, and economic aspects of the rebellion and the French Army's overemphasis on military measures in defeating the F.L.N. caused France to lose the war and withdraw from Algeria.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS

The primary aim of this study has been to analyze the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. For this purpose, a systems approach to insurgency was taken in order to determine the major variables in an insurgency environment. A systems approach to the problem provides us with a framework that helps us to identify and analyze an insurgency in a methodologically sound way as we just did with the 1954-1962 Algerian insurgency. Moreover, a systems approach to problem of insurgency allows policy makers and military leadership to view insurgency in its entirety, instead of focusing only on the armed activities of an insurgent organization.

With a systems approach, an insurgent organization is defined as an open system, which continuously interacts with its environment. After constructing the model and analyzing environmental factors that influence the genesis of a rebellion, three major variables need to be considered; insurgent organization, popular support, and external support.

The insurgent organization is defined to be the driving force of an insurgency. The organization obtains recruits, weapons, money, food, and other critical materials from external and internal sources, and processes and transforms these inputs into outputs in the form of sabotage, assassinations, bombings, and guerrilla activities. To coordinate its activities and achieve its objectives, the organization is divided into two different components: a political organization and a military organization. The political component is the underground part of the insurgent organization which supplies the military component with recruits, weapons, food, money, and intelligence, and creates an alternative government to the incumbent regime through subversion, infiltration, and establishment of a parallel hierarchy. The military component is the overt component of the organization. The activities of both components are closely coordinated; and the military component is almost always under close scrutiny and the control of the political party through political commissars in every unit.

An insurgency is characterized as a contest for the control of the population. To that end, both government forces and insurgents use a combination of coercive and persuasive techniques, with the balance between the two methods varying in different insurgencies and in different stages of an insurgency. Although proved to be effective in the short-term, coercion is a double-edged sword; when used in an indiscriminate and unselective way, it is more likely to instigate more aggression than to intimidate and compel obedience.

The question of whether economic development programs increase the popular support for the Authority or they help the insurgents to grow is also addressed. Economic development projects, without providing security to the population and destroying the underground component of the insurgent organization within the population, are more likely to be counterproductive. Providing security to the population without development is insufficient to eradicate an insurgency, whereas providing development without security is futile and fruitless.

External support for an insurgent organization is an important factor in the evolution and development of an insurgent movement. Nevertheless, its importance and effect is limited and secondary when compared to domestic factors. Although the existence of external support helps an insurgent organization, it may still succeed without substantial amount of external aid. In contrast, if Authority wants to defeat an insurgent organization, it must prevent the flow of sources and militants from a neighboring country. The objective of the government efforts must be to deny the insurgents free space in which to maneuver.

Revolutionary movements have used various strategies to achieve their goals. This study mainly focuses on the rural-based insurgency strategies: the protracted war model developed by Mao and the *foco* theory developed by Che Guevara. Although both strategies accepted a rural-based struggle, there are important differences between the two models. The Chinese model of insurgency is a bottom-up model, which requires hard organizational work to gain support and compliance from the population. In contrast, the Cuban version of insurgency is a top-bottom approach relying heavily on the appeal of *foco* to inspire villagers to join the revolutionary movement. Terrorism, as a strategy of

insurgency, is analyzed in the context of an insurgent environment in which “terror” is used as a supplementary and auxiliary weapon to other forms of revolutionary struggle. Terror plays an important role in the overall revolutionary war, but its importance is restricted mainly to the initial phases of an insurgency. As the insurgent movement grows, terror takes a backseat to other modes of struggle and finds itself in a secondary and supplementary role. Although terror provides important benefits to an insurgent organization, with its inherent limitations (the fact that it can destroy, but cannot build), it cannot be the final determinant of a revolutionary struggle; it can only be a supplementary strategy to the higher modes of struggle, such as guerrilla or conventional warfare.

There are mainly two counterinsurgency warfare approaches to rural-based insurgent movements: use of a cost-benefit or hearts-and-minds model. The differences between the models originate from their different perceptions of the nature of insurgency. The cost-benefit model views insurgency mainly as a military problem that is generated by an insurgent organization without recourse to the grievances of the people, whereas the hearts-and-minds model views insurgency as a political-social-economic problem that is created by a combination of different factors such as economic, social, and political problems plus communist meddling.

In the light of our analyses of the nature of insurgency, strategies of insurgency, and counterinsurgency warfare, the French counterinsurgency struggle in Algeria was analyzed. In doing so I had two aims: First, to analyze the evolution and characteristics of French counterinsurgency doctrine and its consequences on the outcome of the war; and, second, to analyze the tactics and strategies of the F.L.N. and the effects of these strategies on the success of the national liberation war. Ignorance about the political, social, and economic problems of the Algerian Muslims combined with a heavy-handed military approach to the Algerian rebellion caused the French to accept defeat and leave Algeria. Although the French managed to win the battles, after eight years of bitter struggle, they lost the war. By provoking the French to overreact through a campaign of terrorist acts and guerrilla warfare, the F.L.N. managed to break the links between the Algerians and the French administration. The F.L.N. also caused considerable fissures within France itself. The French overreaction to the F.L.N., indiscriminate use of force,

and the routine implementation of torture during investigations caused considerable loss of prestige for France in the international arena.

B. CONCLUDING REMARKS

After a thorough analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, and a detailed examination of the French counterinsurgency struggle during the Algerian rebellion, we can derive following lessons:

- (1) Insurgents consider mass support the primary condition for their success; winning and maintaining popular support remains their central objective throughout the struggle.
- (2) Given the primacy of political, social, and economic factors over military measures, the Algerian liberation movement never had to develop from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare stage to win; the French army was not defeated militarily; the political victory was greatly advanced by mass demonstrations in cities and by the political crisis in France provoked by the protracted and costly imperialist wars first in Indochina and then in Algeria.
- (3) Popular support for the guerrillas is predicated upon the moral alienation of the masses from the existing government. We see this in the methods the French Army used helped to alienate Algerians from the French rule.
- (4) The conditions leading to revolutionary wars are not created by conspiracy. The French insisted on viewing the Algerian rebellion as part of a communist conspiracy and ignored the real underlying causes.
- (5) A revolutionary guerrilla movement concentrates on “out-administering,” not on “outfighting” the enemy. The control of the population and the process of subversion are more important than the actual fighting.
- (6) Algerian nationalists obtained considerable aid from both Tunisia and Morocco. After they built the Morice line, the French Army managed to prevent most of the flow of supplies and insurgents. As a result, the size and scale of insurgent operations decreased sharply. However, the French

Army could not destroy the F.L.N., and Algerians continued to form an army-in-being in the other side of the Tunisian border. Internal forces of the F.L.N. managed to survive through domestic assistance. By keeping the population under firm control, the F.L.N. won the war even after the flow of external sources came to a halt.

It should be possible to examine any insurgency using the model and variables presented in this study. It is not my intention to present a blueprint strategy that could defeat any insurgency. Admittedly, different insurgencies show remarkable differences and every insurgency must be examined under its contextual environment. In analyzing a specific insurgency, countless new variables must be included to and examined in the insurgency equation along with the major variables presented in this study. Yet, even after analyzing these countless variables and drawing a detailed map of an insurgency, policy makers and military leaders would still need a guiding mechanism –a compass – that could allow an Authority to direct its efforts in the right direction.

As a compass has little use without a correct and detailed map, the model and variables presented here are insufficient to predict and manipulate the outcome of a rebellion. As Sir Robert Thompson (1969) remarked when criticizing the American approach to Vietnam, “doubling the effort” in the wrong direction “only squares the error” (p. 89). The model and variables can help an Authority to find the right direction and can be used to plan, assess, and evaluate tactics, operations, and strategies while conducting a counterinsurgency.

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